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The purpose of my paper is to provide a comprehensive treatment of 
the relation between monetary policy and the.Euro~dollar market,. In 
doing so I treat the effects of Euro-dollars on the monetary policies of. 
the U.S. and of .the countries outside the U.S. separately. This was 
done for the sake.of simplicity and clarity, as well as to emphasize 
the'importance of the market for the Federal Reserve. 
In the btbliography .. I have attempted to provide as inclusive a 
listing of matei;ials bearing on .the topic of ,my paper as possible~ This 
was done in order to provide a'starting point for others wishing to 
study related topics. 
I would like to thank Dr. Rudolph Trenton, my thesis adviser, for 
encouragement as well as his advice regarding the .subject matter. My 
appreciation is also extended to Dr. Frank Steindl who read early 
drafts of the paper and corrected my.tendency to be too cryptic. 
Finally, I want to thank my mother for her pati.ence and. Bill. 
Deschler for hi1;1 invaluable. aS!sis.tance and insptration. 
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In many works concerning the,Euro-dollar market p.ass:f;.ng.reference 
is made to the,effect•Euro-dollars ha~e had on the mot;ietary policies of. 
various countries .or to the effect that monetary authorities have.had 
on the . Euro-dollar tnarke t. · In all but the rarest instances , however, 
the treatment has been. cursory at best. Einzig included .-in his book 
a chapter on the "Attitude of Central Banks!' toward the Euro~dollar 
market in which he discussed ways in which the control of the.central 
banks over their money markets had been weakened by the Euro~dollar 
. ' 
market ~-1 In that chapter Einzig also commented . on the use. of Euro-
dollars .as.an aid to the monetary authorities. Einzig, however, did 
not go into depth nor was he very comprehensive regardtng the ef_fects 
of the Eu.ro~dollar market on U ~ S. monetary policy. Furthermore, the 
material he dealt with was'pre"".1965 and many i:mportant dev~lopments 
have occurred since then., 2 
In 1968, Glendenning wrote. about the. potentially destabilizing 
effects of the Euro-dollar market, ·· and he advocated that a lender of 
last resort be set.up for the.Euro-dollar market through the cooperation 
lPaul Einzig, The Euro~Dollar, System; Practice aruL Theory of 
International Interest•Rates (2d. ed., New York: ·st~ Martin's Presi;;, 
196'5), pp. 112:...123. 
2There is a 1967 edition of The Euro-Dolla·r System; -however, it 




of the Federal Reserve and the Bank for International. Settlements 
(BIS). 3 He suggested that the BIS have a stand-by agreement with the 
Federal Reserve, on which it.could draw at its own initiative. 
Clendenning pointed out that the.volume of funds available.to the BIS 
would have to be s.ubstantial ~nough to meet• a major crisis~ 
ijerbert Christie wrote a brief article for The Banker in 1967· 
disc4ssing some of the poss·ible effects -of Euro-dollars on the payments 
balances of the United States and the United Kingdom. 4 He points out 
that the original deposit in the U. s. is a liquid liability to a 
foreigner; so that an increase in Eu.ro-dollar deposits could increase 
the deficit in the U. S. balance of.payments, measured on a liquidity 
basis. Iri actuality Euro-dollar deposits grew through foreigners de-
positing funds they had already accumulated because the U. S. had been 
running a·payments deficit. He also explains ·that U. S. borrowing of 
Euro-dollars·leaves total U~ S. liquid liabilities to foreigners un-
changed because an existing short-term liability to a foreigner becomes 
a liability to the foreign branch of a U. S. bank. 5 Thus American 
borrowing of Euro-dollars does.not affect the U. S. payments balance 
measured on a liquidity basis. 
There is no comprehertsive treatment in the literature of the ef-
fects.of Euro-dollars on monetary.policy or of the effe9ts of monetary 
policy on the Euro:-dpllar market; This paper shows that the.monetary 
3E. Wayne Clendenning, 11Eµ:ro-d6llars: the Problem of Control," 
The Banker, CXVIII (April, 1968), pp. 321~329. 
4Herbert Christie, "Euro-dollars and the Balance of Payments, 
TheBanker, CXVIII (January, 1967), p. 40, 
authorities should be concerned about the Euro-dollar market for 
reasons of domestic monetary policy as well as international monetary 
policy. Having established that Euro-dollars can and do affect the 
policies of central banks, the paper examines the ways in which the 
monetary officials may influence the market. 
Chapter II contains a general description of the Euro-dollar mar-
ket in which banks outside the U. S. issue liabilities and acquire 
claims denominated in U. S. dollars. Participants in the market in-
clude commercial banks, businesses and official institutions from 
throughout the. world. Interest rates are determined by the market 
forces of supply and demand. Through this market significant amounts 
of capital may flow to and from many countries. 
3 
Chapter III, Official Concern With the Euro-Dollar Market, shows 
that in general the market has made domestic monetary policies mo:ce 
interdependent, Euro-dollars have also added to the threat of specu-
lation by increasing the potential flow of capital from country to 
country. The possibility that b.anks faced with large scale Euro-
dollar loan defaults could exert pressure on their countries' exchange. 
reserve.s is also discussed. 
Having examined the general influences of the market on the con-
cerns of central bankers, the paper deals with specific effects on 
the U. S, in Chapter IV. The Euro-dollar market affects U. S" domest:j_c 
monetary policy by its influence on the money supply, credit, intere.st 
rates, velocity, reserve requirements, and Re.gulation Q. The U. S. 
balance of payments as defined on a liquidity basis and on an official 
settlements basis may be affected by the growth of the market, The 
effects that Euro-dollars have had and might have on ex~hange rates 
4 
and reserves are also examined in Chapter IV. 
Chapter Vis concerned with the ways in which monetary authorities 
have made use of Euro-dollars as a tool of monetary policy. The role 
of Euro-dollars in transferring capital among countries is d~scussed 
with reference tp effects on domestic monetary policy, as well as on 
exchange rates and balance of payments, 
Central banks have had important effects on the Et1ro-dollar mar-
ket.- This is the. subject of Chapter VI. The discussion includes 
both indirect influences, through exchange rates, interest rate policy, 
and general regulations concerning bank competitiveness, and direct 
influences, such as direct placements or w::1.thdrawals, operations in 
forward markets, and swaps amen~ official institutions. 
The final chapter contains the summary and conclu~ions, along with 
recommendations for further study. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EURO-DOLLAR MARK.ET 
Since 1957, 1 a market for dollars has developed in foreign 
financial centers whi~h has had--and is having--a profound effect on 
domestic and international finance. Traditional money markets--New 
York, London, Paris, Zurich--may have served international customers, 
but they were tied to a national credit structure~ The monetary author-
iti.es of the different countries could control and regulate their mar-
kets; and conditions in the markets were strongly influenced by 
economic situations in the respective nations. In the new market 
"institutions operating in the market acquire claims and issue liabil-
ities in a currency other than that of their country of residence."2 
The Federal Reserve System cannot regulate the rates that London or 
Paris will pay on their dollar deposits and loans; nor may other cen~ 
tral bankers regulate any but their own nationals' activities in the 
market. As a whole, the market is beyond the control or regulation of 
arty national monetary authority, and in that way is not tied to any 
domestic credit structure as other markets are. 
Since banks from many countries participate, the rates in the mar-
ket.are not determined by events in one country alone, but by forces 
1Einzig, 'rpe Euro-Dollar System, p. 2. 
2Alexander K. Swoboda, The Euro-Dollar Market: An Interpretation 
(Princeton Uri.iversi ty Essays- in Inte:mat'ional Finance, No.· 64, Prince-
ton Un;i.versity Press, 1968), p. 1. 
5 
in all the major industrial countries. The United States' financial 
' ' 
situation does have great importance for the market, but the fact that 
investors and borrowers can obtain rates different than those in New 
York has been the reason for the ex:i,.stance and growth of the market~ 
Participants in the market are from all over the world, Europe, 
Japan, Latin America, even Russia. 3 United States' commercial banks 
also participate in the market through their.foreign branches. In 
1964, the Bank for International Settlements estimated that over thirty 
percent of the final borrowers were from outside Western Europe and 
North America.4 
The three mc;,st noteworthy features of the new market are: fi.rst 
and foremost, the international character of the interest rates, which 
has been discussed above; secondly, the degree of competitiveness in 
the market; and finally, the relation of the market and the role of 
the dollar in world finance .. 
The competitive nature of the market is an outstanding feature 
because it contrasts with the restricted and regulated nature of many 
domestic money markets. The new market is free from artificial re-
strictions on interest rates imposed by national governments or self-
imposed by lenders within various countries. In Europe, cartel agree-
ments or·gentlemen's agreements regarding traditional banking business 
prevents banks from competing with one another through interest rates 
... 
or.from poaching on one another's preserves. In the market for foreign 
3Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, pp. 29-31. 
. . . 
4Thirty-fourth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements 
(Basle, 8th Junel964)~ p; 135. 
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dollar deposits these agreements do not exist.5 Furthermo:re, since 
competition for deposits and loans is not confined within the borders 
of any country, · cartel agre.e.ments between members of ap.y one. batiking 
eommunity .would prove unworkable. Borrowers or lenders in the market 
are able to circumvent artificial rigidities imposed by local bankers· 
by.turning to banks abroad.6 
Most· money markets are competitive to some degree; however, the 
new market _is so much more so that· its competitiveness. is a dis tin:-
guishing characteristic'. 
The dollar obviously plays an important part i.n the international 
monetary system. It is used as a reserve unit by most countries; other. 
exchange rates are pegged in terms of dollars; exporters and importers 
carry on a great deal of trade in dollars. 7 Alexander Swoboda .claims 
that the new market in dollars is part of the. "exp.anding vehicle-
currency status of the dollar. 11 8 Putting it more strongly, Ernest 
Bl.och asserts that the dollar, iµ. this new fqrm, is becoming "a. trtily 
international money supply. 119 
5Einzig, 1!J:e Euro...,Dollar System; pp. 99-100, 146, and 150; "Sus-
tained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking," Monthly Economic Letter,. Firs; 
National City Bank of New York (October~ 1968), p. 119. 
6Einzig, The'Euro-Do.llar System, pp. 99~100. 
7Thirty....,fourth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements,· 
p. 133. . . 
Bswoboda,. p. 29. 
9Ernest Bioch, "Eurodollars; An Emerging International Money Mar-. 
ket," The Bulletin, New York.University, Graduate School of Business 
Administration, · C. J. Devine Institute of Finance xxx:rx (April, 1966), 
p. 10. Soniewhat contradictorily, Bloch stat.es, "I.n this competition 
for funds, Eu.robatiks behave like conventional fina.ncial·intermediaries 
in this· country; the E$ market as a whole can thus be viewed as yet 
another layer in the process of· financial, intermediation within the 
United. States economy." p. 6. 
8 
Creation of EurorDollars 
The market described above is known as the Euro-dollar market, 
primarily because it was in Europe where foreign deposits of dollars 
first began to be lent and borrowed. A Euro-dollar 10 deposit comes 
into existence when a holder of dollars, either in the U. S. or abroad, 
places them with a bank which deals in the market, a Euro-bank. The 
original dollars may be in the form of currency, but for the most part 
they are held in the form of demand deposits with U, S, banks. A 
demand deposit with a U. S. bank becomes; a Euro-dollar deposit when a 
Euro-bank accepts the deposit for a period of time. As far as the 
U. S. banking system is concerned, the only change is a transfer of 
the title of ownership of the demand deposit in the,U. S. from the ori-
ginal holder to the Euro-bank, For .the Euro-banks, the formation of 
a Euro-dollar deposit is shown by an increase in their liabilitie13 and 
assets in the same amount. (See Fig1,1re 1-A.) The liability is the 
claim the original holder has on the Euro-bank while the as.set is the 
claim the Euro-bank has on the American banking eystem. Note that 
both the liabilities and assets of the foreign bank are denominated in 
_dollars, the unit of . account pf the U, S. 
The Euro--bank seeks to make a profit on its deposits by lending 
at a rate higher than the one it is paying to its depositors. A loan 
of Euro-dollars is shown by a decrease in.the Euro-banks' claims 
10rt sq.ould be noted here that currencies other than the dollar 
are dealt in in the same manner and together with dollars form the 
"Euro.;,.currency market." However, Euro-dollars are the mainstay of the 
Euro-currency market. The concern of this paper will be with the mar-
ket for foreign dollar deposits only; although much of what will be 
said may also be applied to the Euro-currency market. 
r,,,. ,,;1(o·() 
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on U.S. bai;i.ks(cash assets) and an increase in its clatm on the final 
bor~ower~ {Figure 1-B.) 
In this illustration, the only c;:ase considered is that in which 
the bank lends to the final borrower. In practice, it is common for 
Euro-~ollars to be loaned .. several times. before they reach the end user. 
Size of the Euro-Dollar Market 
o., L. Altman wrote in 1963 that any estimate of the size of the 
Euro-dollar market would have to be.a guess, and probably a wild one. 11 
While this is perhaps to~ strong a statement, it is true that statis,-
ti cal problems do prevent. a pre.cise picture of the market from being 
drawn. 
The-primary problem in estimation of .the size of the.market for 
Euro-dollar deposits-is the lack of agreement on the definition of 
Euro-dollars. The reason for considering them as distinct from ordi-
nary dollar.a pn deposit in the United States is the .function performed 
by Euro-dollars and their significance fo-:r the world monetary system. 
rhe Euro-dollar market constitu·~es an.international money ma:rket, with. 
rates determined by international forces and capital allocated inter-· 
nat:ionally. It is in this that the significance and distinguishing 
feature of Euro~dollars lte. 
Some have applied the definition, all dollar deposits held at non-
American banks, .ta Euro-dollars;, 12 but this includes· funds which do 
llo, L, Altman, "Recent Developments in Foreign Markets," Tnt,er-
nati_onal Monetary Fµnd Staff Papers-, X (March, 1963), p. 49 ~ 
. ',· " 
12 Swoboda, '.P~ 1; 'iThe Turnaround in World Interest.Rates," Monthly'. 
_Economic Letter, First National City Bank of New' Yot:'k (February, 1967), 
p. 21'. ' ' 
12 
not form part of ·the international money market. Dollar deposits were 
held in Canadian .banks for a loi;ig time and.yet never constituted an 
international m1:mey ma·rket because they were used mainly for relending 
in .New York. l 3 · Many dollar deposits are excluded from th~ 'market be-
cause only large amounts are traded. I'+ Deposits may b.e held, in the 
form of.dollars in foreign bank1;1 simply as working balances, for in-
·stance, · the dollars held . by ·an .. i~porter . t() c!ear accounts. Finally, 
all banks o~tside the U~ s, are not participEll).ts in the Euro-dollar 
market. 
The Bank of England!s "implied" definition o:I; Euro-dollars is 
"dollar deposi_ts held by non-residents. 111 5 This again is too broad 
~ince dollar deposits may be held which the owner does not lend to 
anyone, 
An even more.· encompassing definition is that put forth by the 
Wall Street Journal,. ,idollars owned by governments, businesses or iridi;- · 
viduals residip.g outside the U. S. 111.6 This would include as Euro"'." 
dollars all the dollars held, as reserves by monetary authorities, 17 
dollars held i-q. the form:of currency, dollars held. by persons or firms 
13Einzig, The Euro:-~ollar System,.pp. 1-2. "Traditionally, they 
[ Ca~adiart cpmmercian· bank's]·. have employed them· in U. S, markets; dur- . 
ing recent years, t°Q,ey have also channeled short-term U, S,, dollar 
deposits into the Euro,-dollar market." ''Trends in the Eurodoliar Mar"".' 
ket," Monthly .~conomic-Letter, First National City Bank of New York 
(July, 1966) ~ i>· a1. · ·: . . 
l'+Einzig, The Euro~Pollar Sy~tem, p. 32, 
15Ibid., p. 172 .• 
16The Wall Street Journal~ February 7, 1969, p. 4. 
l 7This :is not to say that all dollars owned by governments. are not 
:in the market~· In the . early formation of the Euro:....dollar market, cen-
tral bankers were.the ma:in suppliers of funds. 
13 
not in the remotest way connected with any international money market. 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which compiles data 
on the market for central banks, has endorsed·a narrower definition of 
a Euro-dollar which states that it is "a dollar that has been acquired 
by a bank outside the United States and is used directly or after con-
version into another .. currency for lending to a non.,,-bank customer, per-
haps after one or more redeposits from one bank to another •1118 As the 
BIS points out, this definition implies that not all dollar assets or 
all dollar liabilities can be considered Euro-dollars. 19 It was noted 
previously that banks may hav.e dollar deposit· liabilities for purposes 
other than lending them in the market. On the other hand; a bank may 
have dollar assets, for example as desired reserves, which are.not 
available to borrowers. At the same time, there is no class of assets 
or liabilities which is per se exempt from the Euro-d6llar market, 20 
because with a change in rates, ·or another variable, these assets and· 
liabilities may become Euro-dollars. For example, assume a bank which 
had been holding dollars as desired reserves is faced with a rise in 
the Euro-dollar rateo The opportunity cost of holding dollars as re-
serves has increased because the rate of return on Euro-dollars, an 
alternative investment, has increased. Therefore, the bank may adjust 
its portfolio. These dollars held on the margin as desired reserves 
may be lent in the form of Euro:-dollars. 
It is also noted iri the BIS's discussion that banks may have 





dollar holdings which were not obtained by accepting a dollar deposit; 
bal'.lks may convert other currency deposits into dollars, Similarly, a 
bank may change its dollar deposits into another currency before loan-
ing the funds out, 21 Therefore, discrepancies may exist between dollar 
assets and liabilities (which would disappear if all foreign currencies · 
were taken together). 
Since neither all assets nor all liabilities may be considered 
Euro-dollars; and since some dollars that the, bank lends may not show 
up on the liability side of its balance sheet and some dollars that 
are accepted by the bank may not show up on the asset side; it follows 
that Euro'."'dollars cannot be considered as exclusively deposits or as 
exclusively loans. Beith assets and liabilities must be taken into 
account. 2 2. 
This definition of the BIS's is in one respect too restrictive, 
for it excludes. all dollar.s which are not lent to a non-,bank customer. 
However, many dollar deposits are circulated simply among banks and 
yet they do form part of the international market .for dollars.23 One 
example may be dollars which are forwarded t:o head offices by European 
branches of American banks, The BIS points out· that banks do use E1.1l!''~if.· 
dollars for investing in money market instruments. 24 
21Ibid., pp. 127-,129,. 
22Ibid., p. 129. 
23Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p •. 172; 0. L. Altman, "Euro-
Dollars: Some FurtherComments, 11 International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers, XII (March, 1965), pp. 3-4, 
24Thirty-,,fourth Annual Report, Bank for International .Settlements, 
p. 132; Thirty-sixth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements 
(Basle, 13th June 1966), p. 146. 
15 
Paul Einzig has defined Euro-dollars as "time deposits in.terms 
of dollars lent and borrowed in financial centres outside the U. S. 112 5 
This obviously is not· in. line w~th the thought· of· the BIS that· dollar 
liabilities alone do not include a.11 the funds in the Euro-dollar mar-
ket~· It is broader than the B.IS's ·definition in that it encompasses 
dollar deposits placed with a~d accepted by banks alone. Furthermore, 
the phrase "irt financial centres" 'Seems to get at. the cr.ux of the. mat-
ter, that .is the funds being in the international money market.. It 
seems. possible that there might be cases in which dollars might be 
lent· and borz:owed outside the U. S. without their being part of the 
money market. 
Since differing definitions of .Euro-dollars are in widespre,ad 
use, when figures are quoted regardfng these funds it.is importa"Q.t to 
note which definition is being used. 
Furthermore~ the more restr;ct:ive definitions do not 1,end·them-
selves to m~asurement; There are statistics available on dollar lta-
bilities and assets of foreign banks,' but not, on which of these are 
nlent and borrowed" (Eip,zig's definition), nor on which are lent to "a .. 
nonbank customern (the BIS 's de'finition). 
Double-counting and different methods of reporting2 6 must. also be 
taken into account~ Since Euro-dollars may be lent among banks several 
times before reaching their final user, the same funds may show up on 
the balance sheets of two or more banks. In the BIS data this 
2 5Paul Einzig, A Textbook on Foreign Exchange (New York:. St. 
Martin's Press, 19 66) , p. 236. 
26Thirty-sixth. Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements., 
p. 147. ', 
16 
possibility is reduced because the fifteenth of each month is the 
reporting date for all countries contributing statistics to the BIS, 27 
but it is not eliminated,28 
In the words of the BIS, "The best that can be done is to present 
data on the banks' foreign currency liabilities and assets and then to 
arrive at some reasonable approximation of the most likely volume of 
funds in the Euro-currency market." 29 Estimates have to be made of the 
proportion of dollar assets and liabilities which serve purposes dif-
ferent than those of Euro-dollars, for example, pure interest,arbit-
rage. 30 
Using this method, the BIS estimated the size of the market to be 
about $16 billion at the end of 196 7, 31 which is approximately $11 
billion greater than at the end of 1963. (The BIS estimated the size · 
of the Euro-dollar market in September, 1963 as $5 billion. 32 ) In 
27The following countries report Euro-dollar statistics to the 
BIS: Belgium-Luxemburg, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan. Euro-dollar credits which 
are not channeled through the banks of one of these countries do not 
show up in the BIS data. Thirty-eighth Annual Report, Bank for !nter-
national Settlements (Basle, 10th June 1968), pp. 146 and 153-154. 
28Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p. 17; Thirty-,-fourth Annual 
Report, Bank for International Settlements, p. 129; Thirty-eighth 
Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements, p. 153. · 
29Thirty...;,fourth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements, 
p. 129. 
30Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System,p. 173; Thirty-eighth Annual 
Report, Bank for International Settlements, p. 153. 
' 31 Thirty-eighth Annual Report .. Bank for International Settlements, 
p. 145. 
32Thitty-fourth Annual.Report, .Bank for International Settlements, 
p. 130. 
17 
October of 1968, the. First Nat;.ional City Bank of New York estimated 
the market to be approximately $20 billion. 33 More. recently, in the 
latter part of March, 1969; The Wal.1 Street Journal put the total of 
dollars held in European banks or owned by Europeans at $23 billion. 34 
The value of the estimates lay not in the precise dollar amount; rather 
I 
it indicates.the order of magnitude of the market.and that large sums 
can be lent or borrowed without causing great 1fluctuations in market 
rates. 
Participants.in the Euro-Dollar Market 
Lenders and borrowers of Euro.,,dollars vary with changing economic 
oondi tions. and political tens ions. For instance, during the cred~ t 
crunch of 1966, American banks absorbed approximately three-fourths 
of the.$3 billion increase it). the size of'the Euro:-,dollar market.' 
Foreign bra.nches of. American banks borrowed heavily in· the market and 
. . . 
then forwarded the.funds to their parent banks. In 1967, when mane,.. 
tary · policy was easier in the U. S,, banks there absorbed only one-
fourth of the. $3 billion increase i.J.i. new fl.lnds from the previous 
year. 35 During the Middle East.crisis in June of 1967, the supply of 
33The Fi_rst National City .Bank uses. the definition "U. S. dollars 
held on deposit ·with banks outside the United States." However, that 
bank quote$ the. same figure of $16 billion., as the BIS does, for the 
size of the market at the end of 1967. · "Sustained Expansion in Euro-
dollar Banking," p. 116. 
34The,WalJ Street Journal, March 18, 1969, ·p, 32. 
35Thirty-eighth Annual.Repert, Bank for International Settlements, 
p. 145, See also Figure 3, p. 21. 
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Euro-q.ollars was reduced sharply as "precaut:j.onary withdrawals II were 
made. 36 
Up to 1963, the main sources of Euro-dollars were official iristi-
tutions ~ central banks an,d ·. international financial organizations. 37 
Since th~n, 'private iridividuals, bu.sine~ses and commercial .banks have 
supplied the major portion of Euro-dollars.3 8 Exporters and importers 
are large users' of Euro;-dollars since· mu(i!h of world trade . is carried 
on in dollars. and in many cases Euro-dollar loans are easier and less 
expensive to obtain than loans in .dQmestic currend.efl. 39 
figure 2, whi.c;;.h gives a breakdown of sources and uses of Euro:-
dollars by grpups of countries, shows.that the u~ s; is irt general 
a net borrower while qountries outside Wes ter:n Europe are net· lenders. 
The noteworthy feature of this .chart is that it shows that Euro-dollars 
a.re lent and borrowed. throughout the world~ 
()ne: of, the mo.st important developments in the mark.et _has 'been 
the growing participati"on of U. S~ commero.ial banks through overseas 
branches. In the last two years; 1967 ·through 1968, the number of 
foreign branches ·has jumped from 244 to 388, an increase of 159 per-
cent. 40 Head offices in the u. S. can lend or borrow Euro-dollars by 
36 Annu.al Report, . Board of· Governors of the, Federal Reserve System 
(196 n, PP. 14-15 and 219. 
37Einzig. A Textbook.on Foreign Exchange,. p. 156; Werner M. M.~ 
Makowski, "The Euro:..nollar Market, 11 · The- Challenge· of International 
Finance, ed. Guenter Reimann .and Edwin. F". 'Wigglesworth (New Yo.rk: 
Mc.Graw-Hill, 1966), p. xix. . 
3811sustained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking," p. 117; Makowski, 
p. 95. 
3911Sustained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking," p. 118; Thirty-: 
fourth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements, p. 134.' · 
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Western Europe*. 
Canada, Japan, Middle East, Latin America+ 
[TI] United States· 
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*Major Western European countries whose COIDJllercial banks' 
foreign exchange assets·and liabilities are reported to the 
BIS, namely, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King4om. + Includes also 
Eastern Europe and certain Western European countries not 
reporting to the BIS~ 
Source: "Sustained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking,'' 
Monthly Economic Letter, First National City Bank of New 
York (October·, '1968), p. 117. 
Figure 2~ Euro-Dollar Borrowing and Lending 
According to Region 
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lending to. their branches, which lend to foreigners, or by ac,cepting 
deposits from their branches. Figure 3 shows the growth. in liabilities 
of U. S ~· banks to foreign branches, which, ha$ been phenomenal. In tqe 
first two and a half months of ·1969, ::j.t has been estimated that U.S. 
banks borrowed another $3 billion in the Euro'.""dollar market. 41· U. S. 
banks have:gone more heavily into t~e market in recent_years becc1;use. 
demands for credit -have pushed interest rates ii). the U. S. so high that 
the Regulation Q ceiling on deposit rates has :kept them at art~ficially 
low levels. Therefore~ the U ~ S. banks haye obtained• funds in the. 
Euro~dollar market through their branches who.are not subject to Regu-.,/' 
lation Q, Also, the absence of reserve requirements again$t liab:i,.li.;; 
ties to. fore:j,.gn .branches has ma,de the Euro-dollar market a profitable 
way for banks to increase their reserves. 
Euro-Dollar Rates 
Interest rates on Euro-dollars.vary.with the maturity of the time 
depo1;1it, .with the type of borrower, with estimates of risk, '.with the 
. ' ' ' 
estimated total of borrowing, and so on.42 However, the individual 
Euro-dollar rates ar~ all interrelated and moye together in re'sponse 
to specific inflijences. Since the entire :structur~ of Eurordollar 
rates i.s affecteq irl. the same maIJ.ner by different factors, it is pos-
sible to ·sub.st::j.tute ·one variable for the whble complex of rates and to 
talk about what happens to "the" Euro-dollar rate wheri. this or that 
happeris. 
42Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, pp. 75-79; Altman, "Recent 
Developments in Foreign Markets.," pp, '71-78. 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Note: The data include funds that do not 
originate in the Euro~dollar market:; but, 
U. S. banks' use of Euro-dollar balances 
is not limited to the,amounts reported as 
liabilities to their branche.s. 
Source: "Sustained Expansion iri Eurodollar 
Banking," Monthly Economic Letter, .First 
National City Bank.of New York (October, 
1968) , p •. 118. 
Figure 3, Liabilities of U. S. Banks to 
Their Foreign Branches 
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This proxy variable is not·· the average of all rates ·but is simply 
a representative rate. The· theoretical concept may qe easy to grasp, 
but in empirical: work it is somewhat more difficult since if the Euro-
dollar rate is not· an average of all-:--or some-:-,-rates, then what .is it?. 
It is the rate. paid on '"transactions of normal size by borrowers of, 
first rate standing who, in the est~mation of the mark~t, have not 
borrowed e~clusively ~ ~,43 
All thi.s is not.to say that nothing can happen to widen differen-
tials . between certain· Euro-dollar rates without affecting the whole, 
structure. It does mean that general irif],uences will be felt by the 
market as a whole. For .instance, a 'change in a bank's esti~te of 
the credit-worthiness of a given borrower might alter the .. differential. 
between the rate· charged to that borrower and ·to another one, but both · 
wou;I.d be affected in a.aimilar manner by a lightening of credit'in the 
u. s. 
While.the cost of credit is of prime ·significance in 
any financial market, for Euro-currencies its importance is 
critical. In effect, the opportunity to operate profitably 
inside existing rate spreads, national and·inteni.!;ltional, 
has been the basic incentive for the .banks to develop the 
Euro-currency business.44 
In the Euro-dollar market, most participants are well-known; so de-
fault risk is minimized, and paperwork (credit checks and so forth) is 
minimized. The size of the units dealt in is very large-.-usually $1 ·· 
million--therefore. the average cost of handling Euro-doll.ars is very 
low. Furthermore, the fierce competition in the market reduces pro.fit 
43Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p~ 78. 
44Thirty""'.fourthAnnual Report; Bank for International Settlements,· 
p. 135, 
23 
margins. All these factors make the margins between rates paid to 
depositors and those charged to borrowers small. 4 5. 
In general, the rate on Euro-dollars tends to fall between the 
rates paid.on time deposits in the U. S. and the effective rate.of 
interest on loans in the United Sta.tes ,4 6 Holders of dollar deposits 
would not accept a lower return on. their funds in. the Euro-dollar mar-
ket than they could obtain in New York; nor would borrowers pay more 
for foreign dollar deposits than they would have to pay. for dollar 
deposits acquired in New York. However, the latt:er rate may cease to 
be an upper. limit. if borrowers in the TL S., ,1hsorb the main portion of 
American dollars. Since early 1965, the business conditions in the 
U. S. and · the balance-of-payments guideli.nes have made this the case. 
In the previous discussion, mention was made of the "effective" 
rate.in the U. S. Borrowers in New York are required to maintain.a 
certain percentage of the amount of their loan in the bank (10 to 20 
percent) 47 while borrowers of Euro-dollars are not required to keep 
compensating balances, 48 Thus the actual rate in New York is higher 
than that quoted, and any comparison of rates on dollar~ in New York 
and rates in the Euro-dollar market must take into account this fact. 
45Einzig, The Euro,-Dollar _System, pp, '61-65, There. appears to be 
some. disagreement as to just what interest margins are prevalent. Wit- . 
ness the following two quotations: " .. ,the differentials in.the Euro-
dollar market are of the order of 1/ 4- percent, ••. " Ibid. , p. 159; 
"It may be concluded that an interest markup of 3/4 percent to 1 1/2 
percerit would apply to the vast majority of dollar loans." Altman, 
"Recent Developments in Foreign Markets," p, 74. 
46 G. Carroll Martenson, The Euro-Dollar Market (Boston: Bankers 
Publishing Co.~ 1964), p. 1, 
47Altman, "Recent Developments in Foreign Markets," p. 72. 
48Makowski,; p. 164. 
\ 
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Rates in the Euro-dollar market are closely related to rates ob..:. 
tainable on co~parable dollar instruments in New York. Certificates 
of deposit in the U '. 'S, differ from Euro-dollars ·in the degree of risk 
and in the fact that certificates may be sold on the market; they are 
more liquid than Euro-dollar deposits. Nevertheless these two facili-
ties are looked upon as alternative investment media, and thus the 
differential between the two is regarded as an indicator.of the tight..:. 
ness in the Euro-dollar m~rket. 4 9 The ceiling on.rates paid oncer-
tificates of deposit in the United States, imposed by Regulation Q of 
·the Federal Reserve, at times keeps rates below that at which supply 
and demand are equated. When this happens investors place their.funds 
in other media, and commercial banks and businesses turn to the .Euro-
dollar market to. seek funds. The increased demand increases Euro-dollar 
/ .... 
rates, widening the gap between them and the ceiling deposit rates in 
the U, S. (See Figure 4.) 
Summary 
The amount of funds channeled through the Euro-dollar market is 
large; interest rates are determined almost solely by competitive mar-' 
ket forces; banks, buf':linesses, official institutions and other f:l,.nan-
cial organizations throughout the world lend and borrow Euro-dollars. 
The Euro-dollar market is an important'international market which 
exists along side and competes with domestic money markets and which 
can influence international finance. Eow Euro-dollars affect mone-
tary policy wil.l be considered in the next chapter, 
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OFFICIAL CONCERN WITH THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 
The various monetary authorities have in recent years become 
increasingly concerned with the Euro-dollar market and have shown it 
in many ways, the most striking of which is their direct intervention 
to stabilize the market. The market has grown large enough to have an 
important impact on three areas of vital concern to monetary officials: 
domestic monetary policy, exGhange rates and reserves, and balance of 
payments • · By chann.eling short-term capital :f.nto or out of a country 
the Euro-dollar market can affect these three .. areas. 
Domestic Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy may be helped or.hindered by Euro-dollars. In 
Europe, some central bankers have used dollar deposits as ··a tool to 
aid them in domestic policymaking while other _officials have tried to 
restrict the use of Euro-dollars .to foreign trade financing. 
It has always been true that international capital mobility has 
affected domestic interest rates and that central bankers have had to 
give weight to international considerations. But, by significantly 
increasing the channels through which. capital can flow, the Euro'."'dollar 
market has reduced the possibility of policymakers being able to iso-
late domestic money markets and to pursue independent national mone-. 
tary. policies. Businesses or banks may turn to Euro-dollars fo.r funds 
26 
27 
when interest rates are, high in their countries; .and when co.nditions 
are. slack at home·, banks may. place funds · abroad in o:rder to earn ~ 
hi~erreturn. Thus, the Euro,....dollar market has made monetary policies 
more interdependent.I 
Eu.ro-dollars have be~n a boon to some monetary authorities iri 
that it provided art outlet for their large holdings of· dollars and' 
''enabled them tp use their. exchange reserves as ·an. effectiye monetary 
instrument with wh:(.ch to check capital flow and domes tic liquidity, 112 
As note!I previously, central banks were originally the. main. source of: 
Euro-:-dollars, arid they are still substantial suppliers. Dollar de-: 
posits placed in the Eu.ro,,...dollar market ,generally earn a higher return 
. . . "-.· 
than. dollars placed in deposit!\! iri New York· or in U. S. ;rreasury bills. 
(See Figure 5 a~d 'Figure 6,) Central bankers may, therefore, employ 
dollar reserves in the Euro~dol:;L.ar market for profit considerations. 
Ori the other hand, national monetary officials may indirectly 
supply funds to the Euro-dollar market for reasons connected with 
monetary policy. They may do this through swaps or deposits with their 
COlllillercial banks. 
Suppose: that a central bank encourages its. commercial banks to· 
ho:J.d dollars by swapping dollars with them ·at • favorable rates.~ ln 
other words, the centra:I. ban,k sells dollars spot ·and buys them forw~rd 
at a forward ·exchange rate·at.par with the spot rate or .lower than the 
1Einzig, A Textbook on Foreign Exchange, p. 154; Makowski, ·p. 162; 
Clendirining~ p. 325; ·swoboda, p. JS; Steph'en· H, Axilrod and >Ralph A. 
Young, ''.Interest Rates arici ·Monetary. :rolicy," -Feder.al Reserve Bulletin, 
XLii (September, 1962); p, '1127; Altman, "Recent. Developments in . 
Foreign Markets," p ~ 88, · 
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forward exchange rate in the forward exchange market. The counte!part 
of this transaction is that the commercial banks se:)..1 the domes tic 
currency spot and.buys the domestic currency forward. If the.defini-
tion of reserves irl that country includes dollars then the reserves 
of the country'~ banking system are the same-,-only their. composition 
hal3 changed~ Domestic credit will probably be reduced because leak-
ages iri the form of.foreign investment or loans.to residents of for-
eign cour1.tties will probably be greater from the dollar reserves than·. 
from the domestic currency re.serves. This is bec.ause the. cost of· 
hedging has been reduced or eliminated for the commercial banks, thus 
enabling them to earn a htgher return on dollar investments th,an 
otherwise. If dollars are not considered part'of legal reserves then 
the central bank has reduced the reserve base of the country's bank-, 
ing sy!:ltem through its. swap operations. 
If the monetary officials stipula,te that the dollars must be in'."" 
vested outside of the home.country, then.the commercial banks who 
bought dollars must decrease their loans to residents in their· country. 
Thus· domestic liquidity is contract1:;d. There may be. some feedback· of 
dollars to the country through borrowing of dollars by firms of that 
cour;1.try from foreigners, but 'there is no reason to believe that this 
feedback would equal the outflow. 
National monetary authorities may also place dollar deposits with 
their commercial banks. Everything else being equal, this would in-
crease the reserves of the couniry's banking .system. Some of the 
furi.ds might flow abroad, but some of the dbllars could be used for 
loans to finance domestic credit expansion, 
The .dollars which the commercial banks obtain from their central . ' . 
bank may 11ot necessa:rily be used for investment in the E,uro-dollar 
market. Some funds may be placed in the U •. S, money market; however, 
as _long as yields are ,;elati,vely high. in the Euro-dollar market it 
wil+ attract.some of these dollar funds. 
Inter~ational Monetary Policy 
Central bankers have reason to be concerned not only with the 
effect of Euro-dollars on dom~stic policy, but also with their effect 
on policy in the international sph,(re. · 
Exchange.Rates and Reserves· 
c ' " .. ' 
By.incre~sing the potential flow of capital from country to 
country, the Euro-dollar market has added to the threat of speculative 
pressure on foreign exchange rates and rese:(Ves. When. serious pay-. 
men ts imbalances e:dst; capital flows can force exchange rate changes. 
'!'hez:e·is much concern that, in t:i,.mes of international exchange crises, 
Eti.ro-dollars might be , a significant source of financing for hot money 
flows, 3 
~ayne.Clendenningdiscussed the possibility that'commerc1a1 b~nks 
m:i.ght'place large demands on the reserves.of the~r n~tion if they 
were faced with a shortage of dollars with which to honor their com-
mittnents.4 This might.arise from one of two situations: one, if the 
3clendennii:ig, p. 326.; Eirizig, A.'Textbook on Foreign Exchange, 
p. 161; Altman, "Recent Developments' in Foreign Markets, 17 p. 87. 
4clenderining, pp~ 322-325. 
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bank converted a large amount of Euro-dollars into domestic currency; 
two,. if ,foreignetl:!. defaulted on their. Euro-dollar debts. 
Suppose a commercial bank accepted a time deposit of dollars for 
thirty days and then lent dollars for sixty days, expecting to be able 
to secure another dollar deposit in thirty day$. · If the bank's ex-
pectations proved false, .it might have to' obtain the doll,;irs in the 
foreign exchange market when time came for repayment of the Euro-
dollars. Similarly, if a foreign borrower defaulted on a Euro~dollar' 
loan, the ,bank holding the loan .would probably have to buy the dollars 
in the foreign. exchange market; If the amounts involved were sub-
stantial, downward pressure on the exchange rate would occur, and the 
national monetary authorities would'have to use their dollar reserves 
in.order to keep the rate from falling. "If foreign exchange.re-
serves were seriously depleted this could lead to a run on the cur~ 
rency, 115 
The possibility that this could happen definitely exists since 
Euro-dollar loans are, for the most part, unsecured credits. The 
banking participants in.,the market, all of whoin are of very high 
standing, and the large international business firms·are never asked 
for collateral or guarantees. Banks require security only from com-
mercial firms who are not.of first rate standing, 6 and:even then 
5Clendenning, p. 325. 
6Altman claims that behind the pyramiding of Euro~dollar credits 
there is a network.of "stand..;,by agreements, lines of credit'and bank~ 
ing guarantees" which may expose. commercial banks and· central banks 
to market 'risks which they do not suspect. Altman, ''Euro~Dollars: 
Some Further Comments," · p. 8. 
safeguards may not be very strict. 7 The chances.of participants 
defaulting on unsecured loans or of over-extending themselves are 
small due to the quality of banks and bu!;!inesses in the market; 8 but, 
on the other hand, risks are enhanc.ed by the. fact that .there is no 
way for the lender to knqw the total amount of Euro-dollar credits a 
borrower might haye outstanding. 9 In any case, the risks inherent 
in any misconduct are magnified by·the extent of relending; one de-
fault might ca.use a chain reaction. For example, suppose a French 
bank had, bor~owed three-month Eur.a-dollars from an English bank and· 
on the same day loaned three-month Euro-dollars to a German business 
concern, expecting to repay the English ban,k with the proceeds from 
the German.loan. If the German firm defaulted and the amount of the 
loan:were very large, the French bank might not be able to obtain the 
dollars with which to honor its connni tment. to the Eriglish bank. 
33 
The real danger arises not from potential default by a particular 
borrower, but from "the very real if remote.possibility of wholesale 
default by all debtors in one of the countries which have borrowed 
a high proportion" of Euro-dollars . 1 O Imposition of exchange con-: 
trols, an economic eris is, or politic al. tens ions might bring on such 
a situation. 
Perhaps the mos.t serious risk is that· exchange controls might 
prevent'residents of a country from meeting its international 
7Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, pp. 64"-65. 
8 Ib id ~ , p • 6 6 • 
9Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
1 O Ib id . , p • 14 9 , 
liabilities in Euro,-dollars. As evidence that bankers are, aware of 
this possibility there. is 
'.'the well-known fact that American bank branches in London 
are usually able to borrow Euro-dollars at rates that' are 
fractionally lower than those paid by first-class British 
or other Wester~ European banks .1 1 · 
Einzig argues that the discount. given to American banks is ''because" 
in their case it is inconce~vable that the dollars required, for the 
repayment.of maturing deposits should ever.become unavailab'le. 12 
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There is also the .fact. that as the estimated total of Euro'."'dollars 
borrowed by one country grows, the rate quoted on Euro-dollar loans 
to that·country rises. The explanation is that the rise in.rates is 
a risk premium to cover the possibility that exchange restrictions 
might be. imposed~ 13 
Further evidence in support: of the point that bank$ might not be. 
able to obtain enough dollars in foreign exchange to honor commitme'nts 
is the warning given by the Bank of France to French commercial banks 
that permits for replacement of Euro-dollars lost through a default of 
their debtors would not necessarily be .granted. 14 
In· Europe, some central· bankers . have recognized that Euro-dollars 
can be used to help check capital flowso 1 5 For iristance, the monetary 
officials could keep down an unwanted iriflux of short-term capital by 
l l Ibid., p. 150. 
12Ibid:, p. 419. 
13Ibid., pp. 67c-68. 
14Ibid,, p. 149, 
15Makowski, p. 165. 
making dollars available through swaps,with their commercial banks at 
rates advantageous to the banks. 
Balance of Payments 
35 
In the inter~ational sphere, policymakers· are· also concern.ed with 
the effects :E:uro.-dollars can .have on the balance of payments~ They 
may serve as a means of financing th~ deficit; or they might aggravate 
a payments imbalance by adding to capital outflows. United States' · 
officials are·esp~cially attentive to· the potential impact of Euro-, 
dollars in this ~rea. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF EURO-DOLLARS ON THE UNITED STA'l'ES 
The Federal Reserve has shown increasing awareness of Etiro~dollar 
market and its implicati.ons for U. S; monetary; policy~ This chapter 
deals ·with the reasons why th:e Federal Reserve should be concerned 
with Euro-dollars. Their effect on monetary policy in botli the inter-
national .and domestic spheres will be investigated. 
Domestic Monetary Policy 
The Euro~dollar market affects U, s. domestic .monetary policy by 
± ts influence on several variables: the money supply, credit~ interest 
rates, velocity, reserve requirements, aµd Regulation Q. Each of 
these. is examined separately. 
The nl.arket ·offers batiks an alternative way of obtaining reserves, 
analogous to the Feq.eral Funds market where banks borrow the. excess 
reserves of other banks. In borrowing Euro-dollars, Amertcan banks 
do not increase th-e total of high powered money in the American bank-
' . 
irig system, but they redistribute it. The size of the money supply is· 
~ ·. . . 
affected because bf/channeling reserves td banks who will use them as 
a base for deposit expansion the potential money multiplier is more 
closely, approached by. the actual. The money supply .is . also~lffected ' 
because tlie reserve to deposit. r1;1tio is lowered. when American banks 
borrow Euro-dollar~ through their branches since U. S~ banks are;not 
36 
require!i t~ ho:J.d reserves· agatrist liabilities .to their branches ,-Jv2cJ Y\ 
Figure 7 s.hows how the transactions involved in an American 
bank's ,borrowiD:g Euro..,dollars might show up.on the balance sheets of. 
the various banks concerned. First of all, the Euro-.dollar deposit 
is .. shown on the recqrds of the Eu+o...,bank and the .American bank (I) , 
See Figure 7-A.. Suppose .then that .the Euro-bank .lends the deposit to 
the branch of another American bank (II), This is recorded on the 
balance sheet, of the.first America-q bank by a transfer of ownersh~p 
from the Euro-bank to the.branch.of the sec;ond U. S, bank, The Euro-
bank's deposits with I go down by $10q and its loans go up by $100. 
The.branch bank has· a.claim on I of $100 and a liability to the Euro-
bank in the am9unt of $100. See Figure 7-:8, 
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Assume that the branch bank forwards the .Euro-dollars to its head 
. ' 
pf~ice in New Y<>rk · as shown by Fi.gure 7-C. The· branch decreases its 
deposits with I by $100 and increases its claims on _the· parent bank 
whi~h in~reases its liabilities to foreign subsidiariei;i and increases 
it~ deposits with IIi The first bank .decreases its depostts with the 
branch and.increasei;; its deposits with II. 
The final step in the .transaction is shown in Figure7,:-'D~ when 
the second bank collects. the funds from the. first. The reserves in 
II go up while they decrease fpr L· Interl?arik deposits decrease for 
both banks .. 
Ne~ting out.all these transactions> shows the total reserves 
of th~ American .banking system to. be the same as bE!fore Euro-dollars 
were 'borrowed; the reserves hav.e merely been. red:i,.strib'1ted among banks. 
This is not to say that the money supply remains the .same. 
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Presumably, the reason the parent bank accepted the. Euro'.""dollar deposit 
from Hs subsidiary was to it:icrease its lending power by enlarging tts 
reserve base. Thus.the money supply .is increased because the same 
reserve base is supporting a larger amount of demand deposits. 
The size of the money supply which can be supported on a given 
reserve base is also increased by the Euro~dollar market, due to the 
effect on required reserves of a head office's use of Euro~dollars 
obtained from its. foreign branch. United States banks are not requi.red 
to hold any· reserves against. liabilities to their foreign branches .1 
Thus commercial bail;ks which obtain deposits through their subsidiaries 
abroad have. increased their deposit expansion potential without in-
creasing the_amount of reserves they are required to hold. 
It has been argued that iri practi.ce the Euro-dollar market tends 
to decrease deposit expansion by making the deposits in American banks 
more volatile and· thereby causing banks· to hold .a higher p,recentage 
of reserves against .demand deposits •2 The idea is that as far as 
individual' banks are concerried, ·dollars that previously had been left· 
on deposit for long pel?iods may now be subject to frequent shifts due 
to employment in the new market. However, Goldstein has pointed out 
that although the turnover in deposits may have.increased, it is highly 
probable .. that losses and gains by the individual New York :banks con""" 
nected with the market would even out.3 
lchristie, p. 40. 
2Einzig, The Euro ..... Dollar Syste~, pp. 55-,,56; Martenson, pp. 75-76. 
3H. N. Goldstein, Review of The Euro-Dollar Market, G, ,Carroll 
Martenson, Journal of Finance, XX (September, 1965), pp. 560...,561, 
Martenson noted that to the extent that the Euro-·dollar market 
has caused a shift from time deposits to demand deposits, a h:i-gher 
proportion of deposits must be held in. the form of res€:\rves, This· is 
due to the higher.reserve requirements against demand deposits thap 
agai..ns t time deposits , 
Ernest Bloch, in 1966, wrote about the. use of Eu.ro..,dollars by 
New York bariks to improve thei.t lending capacity, 4 He demonstrated 
that banks could borrow overnight Euro..,dr.illars on Thursday and. get 
the same increase in reser:ves as if they had borrowed in the Federal 
Funds market for th:ree days, The explanation is that the funds bor-
rowed on Thursday are collected and recorded on Friday morning by 
the borrowing bank~ The Euro-dollars which are repaid on Friday are 
not collected until Monday since the clearinghous,e is clo:;;ed on the 
weekends. Figure 8 shows the T--:accounts he .used to explain what 
happens. 
Bloch showed that. increased use of the market for this purpose 
drove the rates on overnight Euro..,dollars on Thursdays up from six 
percent to eleven, percent in the year from March of 1964 to March of 
1965, 5 During the same period, the difference bet"Ween the cost of 
reserves obtained through use of the Federal Funds.market and through 
use of Euro-dollars decreased from five percent to less than one per:-
cent, 6 Competition decreased the p:rofit margin on this use of Euro-
dollars. 
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Bloch was working with data going through 1965; however, as Figure 
3 shows, it was not until 1966 that banks really began to expand their· 
4 . . 
Bloch, pp. 15-22. 
5 lb id , , Tab le 2, p" 12 , 
Thursday Eurobank. 
Assets Liabilities 
DD at N. Y. 
Bank B -lQ 
Loan to N. Y. 
Bank A +10 





New York Bank B . 
DD Eurobank 
DD Bank A 
F.R.B. New York 
-10 
+10 
Friday Eurobank Saturday-Sunday Eurobank 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
_____ _j 
DD at N. Y. 
Bank B +10 
Loan 
Repaid 
New York Bank A New York Bank A 
Clearinghouse J Repay Euro$ -10 Deposit 
Funds -10 N. Y. Fed. +10 
Deposit, 
N. Y . Fed . + 10 
New York Bank B New York Bank B 
Deposit fun- Euro$ +16 Deposit, I 
N. Y. Fed. -10 l DD Bank A -10 _ N •. _Y_._F_e_d. _-_1_0 __________ _ 
F.R.B. New York F.R.B. New York 
I DD Bank A + 10 ! DD Bank A O 
1 DD Bank B -10 _ j DD Bank B O _ 
DD= demand deposit (Balance sheet changes in millions of dollars 
Source: Ernest Bloch, "Eurodollars: An Emerging International Money Market," 
University, Graduate School of Business Administration, c. J. Devine Institute 
(April, 1966) p. 18. 
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Figure 8. Reserve Effects of Thursday Overnight Deposits 




use· of Euro-dollar funds through t:hei:r: btanchi~.s., was then that the 
banks were faced with a c::redit sque.eze because. the F'ederal Rf~serve 
held the. ceiling on rates paid on time deposits well b,elow money mar,.. 
7 . 
ket levels. The ba.riks tri.ed to c:ushi.on this by iric:.re.as ing sharply 
their lia.b i.li ti.es to their fo.r:e.i.gn hr anches • (Se.e. Figure. .3, page 21.) 
Since 1966 Euro-dollars have become inc.re.asingly impo:tta.nt in the 
portfolio management. of the large banks, E''8pecially when they are 
faced with a shortage of liquid funds, One reason for this is that 
portfolio managers who were driven. into the Euro..,dollar market by the 
extreme shortage of.funds in 1966 became familiar with the market and 
the advantages it had to offer, Klopstock, iii his article "Euro-
dollars in the Liquidity and Re.serve Management of the United States 
Banks," had divided head office uses of branch banks' funds intci 
three main categories: continuous borrowing for enlargement of re-
serves, borrowing to finance weekend reserve positions, and rnainten-
ance of operating balances for branch banks. 8 Banks borrow Euro-, 
dollars regularly because of rate. advantages, to keep a hand in the 
market, and because Euro-dollars are not subject to reserve require-
ments or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fees, They a:te not 
used for day:-to-day adjust1nent of reserve positions because the time 
difference between New York and London, the ~11ain channel for Euro'."' 
dollars flowi.ng to the U, S,, is such that when American banks are 
becoming aware of their. need for reserves the London market· is closing, 
7 "Sustained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking," p, 118, 
8Fred H. Klopstock,. "Euro-Dollars in the Liquidity and Reserve 
Map.agement of United States Banks," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, L (Julys 1968), p, 136. 
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Furthermore, usual delivery on Euro-dollar$ is ··two days and. even those 
delivered the same day do ·not become available as res.erves until the 
next day due . to the mechanic$ of clearing funds . Most banks with 
bran·ches abroad use overnight Thursday Euro""dolla:rs as a partial sub-
st:.itute fo:r Federal Funds. Any u. S. head office not bidding for 
Thursday. overnight Euro:-,dollars may suffer sizable losses as other 
banks do. According to Klopstock, aggregate branch balances in head 
offices increase on Thursday by $100 million to $300 mil.lion--ewhich 
does not include balances that may be renewed for Thursday·, 9 Operat-
ing balances of branch banks a:re not· an important source of funds for 
head offices. Euro-dollar deposits, obtained, through branches abroad·. 
have come to be routinely conside.red as part. of portfolio management. 
Euro-dollars may be used by U. S. banks to, expand or contract 
bank credit.. By _borrowing Euro-dollars. through their branches abroad, _.,,., 
American banks may increase their liquid resources with which to in-, 
crease.loans. Conversely; a ·plentiful supply of.short-term funds and 
low interest rates in the U ~ S. could lead American banks to place 
funds abroad in. the Eu.ro'.""'dollar market, thus reducing bank credit in 
the U. S. 
The Federal Reserve has computed a bank credit proxy oh the basis· 
of daily average total member bank deposits. This series· does not 
include the liabilities of U. S. banks to their foreign branches; . i.e., 
acceptance of Euro-dollar deposits by American bank.sJ because they are 
nondeposit liabilities, In 1968 when U, S. banks increased their 
holdings of Euro:-"dollars dramatically (Figure 3, p. 21), the Federal 
9rbid., p. 134. 
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Reserve began to compute an alternative bank credit proxy adju$ted to 
include daily averages of U. S. bank liabilities to foreign branches. 10 
Table 1 shows both the bank· credit. proxy and the adjusted bank credit 
proxy. The inclusion of Euro~dollars yielded a larger figure for 
every month except November.. (The figures for December are not com-
plete.) The explanation for the effect of Euro-dollars during Nov-· 
ember may be that end of year withdrawals from the market produced such 
a tightening in the market that American banks were not willing to pay 
the increased rates which they would have had to in order.to attract 
funds. Iri the other months for which figures are available, Euro-
dollars served to expand bank credit in the U.S. beyond what it would 
have been otherwise. 
The events of.1966 point up that a.U. s. monetary policy which 
,,.---....-,--· . 
focuses on interest rates is hampered by tlie_Euro-dollar market. In 
that year the Federal Reserve, a$ part of its tight monetary policy, 
used Regulation Q to'reduce_the maximum interest'rates payable.on 
time deposits .1 1 At the same time. the credit crunch drove other money 
market rates well above the Regulation Q ceilings, which led large 
investors to reduce their holdin~s of certificates 'of deposit and to~-// 
increase their holdin~s of other money market instruments. The 
l0 11Record of Policy Actions of·the Federal Open Market Committee," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, LV (April,. 1968), p. 350. 
11 In July the Fed decreased from 5 1/2 to 5 perc.ent the maximum 
rates payable on multiple maturity time deposits with maturities of 
90 days or more and decreased·to 4 percent the ceiling on those with 
maturities of less than 90 days. In Septerpber the Fed decreased to 
5 percent from 5 1/2 percent the maximum rate of interest payable on 
tiine deposits under $100,000. "Announcerp.enti;;," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, VII (September~ 1966), p. 1338 and (July, 1966), p·. 980 •. 
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TABLE I 
MONTHLY INCREASES IN·CREDIT PROXY 
AND ADJUSTED PROXY 
Credit Proxy* Proxy With Euro-
Dollars 
1968 April ,-4,5% -3.5% 
May 1.5% 5.0% 
June 6.0% 
July 9.0% 10.5% 
August 2li0% 21.5% 
September 9.0% 10.5% 
October 11.9% 11.5% 
November 13.0% 11.5% 
December 11.5% 
1969 January -3.0% -- .f 
* The credit proxy is the daily average of total member bank 
deposits. 
** 
** This is the credit proxy adjusted to include Euro-dollars which 
are nondeposit liabilities. 
~ Less than $50 million. 
Source; "Record of Policy Actions ·of.Federal Open Market Committee," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, LIV (February, 1968) through LV 
(April, 1969). 
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commercial banks, not ab.le to attract domestic deposits through in::-
terest rates arid faced witq a sizable drain on liquid resources, had 
to either reduce their·earning assets or find another source of funds, 
Those bankE:1 with overseas branches turned heavily to the Euro-dollar L 
market whete they were not bound by Regulation Q~ · The:j.r foreign sub-
sidiaries acquired funds at : the go::(.ng rate in . the market and then for-:-.· 
warded.them to 'their head offices. As is evident from.Figure 3, page. 
24, there, was a dramatic increase in· the liabilities of U. S '. banks 
to their foreign bratlche·s; they rose over $2 billion in the last half 
of the year. 
About four-fifths of the loss in outstand:l.ng C/D.' s suffered 
during the summer and fall <>f 1966 by the ·twelve banks with 
overseas branches wa$. offset by incre.ased Euro-dollar tak-
ings. from branches. 12 
The Euro-dollar market hindered the Federal Reserve's policy of 
affecting credit expansion thr.ough interest rates in .. two ways~ First, 
it enabled commercial banks to circumvent the Regulation Q ceilings . 
on interes.t rates~ Secondly, the high intere.st rates ~Ii the U, S,·: 
attracted funds from the Eurordoll~r market when the Fed was attempt-
ing to U.mit the growth. of credit. Iri a situat~on where the Federal 
Reserve was·keepiq.g interest rates low in order to encourage credit 
expansion, the Euro-dollar market could cause an efflux of funds. from 
the U. ~· ;t.f Et.iro,dollar rates were significantly higher. 
Espe~ially in view of the .international.payments constrai~t, in-
terest rate policy is made more difficult by a large international 
money market which increases capital mobility. Domestic policies may 
'fl,Ot give r:j.se .to an.inflow or.an outflow of capital which would not 
12 . . . 
. ~lops tock, ''Euro-Dollars," pp, 135-136. 
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be consistent with equilibrium in the.international balance of pay-, 
men ts .. A payments deficit. ccmld be aggravated by a. capital outflow 
st~mming from an easy money policy of low interest rates. Conversely, 
a domestic policy of high interest rates could give rise to aµ.influx 
of funds that would add to a payments surplus, 
Nominal rates in the. Euro-dollar market may be high, but the 
effecti:ve rate is lower,due to the fac.t that reserves are not required 
against liabilities to foreign branches and due to the technicalities 
involved in clearing funds. In addition, th~re are no fees for de-
posit insurance. Furthermore~ U, S ., .banks may prefer to concentrate 
competition for dollars throu~h deposit rates in the .Euro~dollar mar-,-
ket .since 
a rise in.U 1 S, deposit rates would raise the cost to the 
U, S, banks of nearly all their deposits whereas a rise in 
Euro.:..dollar rates would raise.the cost of only those de ... 
posits which were held there, a small fr,;1.ction of the 
total. 13 
The Federal Reserve not only plac~s a ceiling on deposit rates 
that p1ay be paid but also regulates the periods for which they may 
be paid. U. S. banks are prohibited from paying interest on deposits 
mcl.turing in less than thirty days, U. S. banks can escape this rule 
legally by acting through their branches abroad in the.Euro-dollar 
market~ 
Interest rate policy may also be impinged upon by the Euro-dollar 
market due to the fact that large corporations who fi,nd rates at home 
too high may go through the Euro-dollar market for their financial 
needs. Similarly, large corporations which find·Eurp-dollar rates 
more profitable may place their depos. its abroad. 
• , I 
13christie, p. 41, 
The Euro-dollar market affects the velocity of mqney by increas-
ing the turnover in deposits. The original placement and subsequent 
lending of Euro-dollars increase the velocity -of circulation of de-
posits. 
International Moneta·ry Poli.cy 
When international flows of credit and capi.tal, are 
consistent with over~all payments balance, the impact of 
international considerations on domestic financial policies 
tends to be minimized. On the other hand, when such out~ 
flows are a factor in a persisting payments imbalance, not 
only ar:e they a conditioning influence upon a country's 
financial policy •.•• , but they also carty the threat· of 
activating speculative movements of. funds, ·which eould 
only aggravate the international payments · problem. 14 · 
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The primary economic objective of the Un4,ted States in the inter'."" 
national sphere is to. attain equilibrium in the international balance· 
of payments. Iri. the meantime however, in order to maintain a "sound· 
dollar," 15 the Fed is. very much concerned with. alleviating temporary 
speculative pressures and other disequilibrating capital flows and 
with reducing "the potential del!land for monetary gold by lessening 
foreign official reserve gains." 16 The key .financial position of the 
dollar in international trade.and finance makes it imperative that 
both goals be. achieved; at the same time, the wide use of the dollar 
14 Axilrod and Young, pp. 1132,-lf3-3. 
15William McChe~ney Martin, ''Monetary Fund Resources and the. 
International Payments System," Federal Reserve Bullet.in, XLVIII 
(March, 1962), p. 28L 
1 6 '.'Cap;ital Flows and International Payments," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, XLVIII (March~ 1962); pp. 277-278. See also:·. Mart.in, p. 
281; Axilrod and Young, p. 1133; "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign 
Exchange Operations," Federal Reserve Bulletin~ XLVIII (September, 
1962), pp. 1150-1151; Aririual Report-, Board of Governors of the Fed~ral 
Reserve System, (1966), p. 35. · 
makes .their ach:i,.evement more difficult. The possibiU.ties for specu-
lati9n agai~st the dollar througq leads and lags, putting forward or 
delaying th~ payments for imports or exports, .are especially great. 17 
United States monetary authorities have reason to be concerned 
wi.th the Euro-dollar market's effect on their'international policy 
objectives. EU'+o-dollars may have.favorable or detrimental effect1;1 
on ~apital flows and therefore on the.balance of payments. 
so 
Defining the U. S. balance of payments on.a liquidity basis, i.e., 
in terms of changes in U ,, S. reserve assets and in liquid liab:i,.l:i,.ties 
to all foreigners, the U. S. balance is not affected by the trading 
of ~uro-dollars among foreigner~; there is·a transfer of owp.ership of 
dollars b.ut no net increase or decrease in dollars owned by foreigners. 
As Altman points .out,· foreigners have obtained dollars because of the 
U. S. balance of payments deficit and where· they deposit'them does 
not change that result.18 
When.Americans deposit dollars with Euro,banks, there is an in,-
crease in foreign claims on the U, S, , i.e. , the balance .of payments 
deficit rises. On the other hand, if loans to foreigners in the form 
of E'\,lro-dollars take.the place of loans in U .. S. dollars to foreigners, 
the . payments balance is improved.\ · 
17 11, •• the presst,ire on the dollar that could be caused by even 
a minor shift in the rate of payments to and from the United States 
(leads and lags) would be greater than the amount. of· speculation that 
eould 'be. financed by the Euro-dollar markets .• II Altman, . 0 Recent 
Developments :t.n Foreign Markets·, 11 p. 87 ~ · See also Einzig, A Textbook 
on · Foreigp.. Exchange, p ~ · 90. 
18Altman, "Recent Developments in Foreign Markets," p. 83. 
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The ma_rket is in and of itself ne:l.t.ber a help nor a hindrance; 
the questioµ is an empiri~al one. According to the liquidity defini-
tion, the Amer_ican balance of payments deficit is increa~ed by the. 
growth of the.Euro-dollar market if "depositors substitute_ Euro-dollar 
deposits for other U. S~ dollar assets to a greater extent than bor....: 
rowers substitute Euro-dollar loans for loans from American banks. 11 19 
Borrowing of Euro:d~llars by American banks does not affect the . 
U. S ~ .balance of payments measured on a liquidity basis because the 
original U, ,s, liability to a foreigner :l,s changed to a liability to 
anothei; foreigner, a foreign branch of an Americ:a:r~ bank/O However, 
the U. S. balance ·of payments may be helped by American. borrowing of 
Euro-dollars if the payments balance is measured according to the 
offi,aial settlements definition. This defines the balance of ·payments 
deficit in term(:l of changes in +~serve as.sets, and in liquid and non,,.. 
liq:ui!ilia.bilities to foreign official monetary institutions. If 
increlils.ed demand· on the part of Am~rican banks raises interest rates 
suffic::l.ently enpugh to attract ,dollar holdings of central banks into 
the market, u ~ s' •li~bilities to foreign official monetary ins ti tu,- . 
tions would.decrease and U. S. liabil:l.ties 1to_foreign commercial banks 
' 
would increase. 
In general, the growth of the Euro-dollar market has undoubtedly 
lessened the flow of .dollars to foreign central qanks, thus benefit-
ing the. U. S. balan~e of payments on an official settlement basis. 21 . 
19swoboda, p. 25 
20christie, p. 40. 
2 1christie menti.ons this effect on p ~ !4l. 
F\lrthermore, to the extent.that central banks hold a proportion of 
their reserves in the market, the u O s ~ deffoi t is reduced according 
to the official settlements definition of the. b.alance of paymentS,. 
52 
The pressure of a U o S; payments defici.t on official reserves 
and thus on exchange rates may definitely be lessened by th.e Euro-
dollar market since it provides a lucrative outlet for foreign holders 
of dollars. Individuals and firms which might have sold accumulated 
dollars to · their central banks and central banks who might have . sold 
dollars to the U ~ .S, for gol9. may now choose to f:!Upply the dollars 
to the U.S. Euro-dollar market. In this connection, the monetary 
authorities may choose to hold dollars rather than gold in order to 
use the Euro-dollars as a. tool of monetar,y policy. 
The. counterpart of this favorable result is that in times of 
crisis the Euro-dollar market may serve to intensify pr~ssure on the 
u; S. gold stock by increasing the facilities and resources.available 
for speculation. "This cannot be prevented unless the government 
concerned resorted to the. extreme measure. of blocking foreign de-
posits. " 22 
This chapter has dealt exclusively ,with the effect of Euro.-
dollars on U. S. monetary policy. Other countries' moneta.ry policies 
may also be affected by the Euro-dollar market .. · 
22Einzig, A Textbook on Foreign Ex,change, p,. 16L 
CHAPTER V 
THE EFFECT OF EURO-DOLLARS ON COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE U. So 
Monetary officials in countries outside the United States have 
become increasingly aware of, and concerned with, the Euro...,dollar mar-
ket and its ramifications :for their policies. To 1:3ome central bankers 
the market has proved a help while to others it has been a hindrance; 
and· to many. it has been both, 
Domestic Monetary Policy 
In three countries in particular, Euro,..,dollars have been used to 
increase domestic liquidi.ty in order to finance economic expansion. 1 
These are West Germany, Italy, and Japa.no 
The Deutsche Bundesbank carties out ''open market operations with 
dollars " 2 by offering dollar swaps to its commercial banks, The 
Bundesbank sells dollars spot· and buys them forwa;td at rates which are 
adjusted to encourage or discourage the i:ommercial banks to hold dol-
lars. 3 Originally, the banks were allowed· to place the dollars where 
they chose; and since the Euro-dollar market was most profitable, the 
lEinzig, The Euro-Dollar Sysitem, pp. 41 and 111. 
2Altman, "Recent Developments in Foreign Markets," p. 85. 
3Einzig, The Euro-,Dollar System, p. 120. 
53 
greatest portion of the dollars found their way there. 4 In 1964, the 
Bundesbank began to limit the maturities of the swaps to three months 
or more and stipulated that the dollars obtained through swaps be itt-
ves ted in . U ~ S. Treasury bills • 5 The reaso'Q.. for this was that Euro-
dollars . had been used for speculation in favor of the 111ark. 6 The, 
dollar funds which the central bank had been supplying had been used 
for investment· in the Euro..,,dollar market where speculators borrowed 
. , r • 
dollars and then converted them into marks. Later, tn different' cir-
cumstanpes, the Bundesbank ·supplied· funds without· stipulating where 
they should be placed.7 
The Banca d'Italia has on vartou~ occasions used dollars to fi~ 
nance expansion of domes tic liquidity, partly by the use of swaps and 
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partly through deposits with the Italian commercial banks. 8 After 
1962, the.Italian authorities allowed their commercial ·banks to borrow 
Euro~dollars to finance domestip trade. 9 At times the amount of Euro-,, 
dollars borrowed by Italy. represented "a11- appreciable proportion of 
4Ibid. 
5Thirty-fo~rth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements, 
p. 132°. . . 
6Einzig, The Euro-Dol~ar ~ystem, pp. 117 and 121. 
7Thirty-seventh-Annual Report, Bank for International. Settlements 
(Basle, 12th June 1967), p. 144; Annual Report, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (1967), pp.· 281~ and-295, and'297!· .. B:owever, 
as the BIS points out, !'The, authorities I swap connni tments with their 
own banks do not necessarily mean that an equivalent amount·of dollars 
is being placed in the Euro-market." . Thirty-fourth Annual Report, Bank 
fo.r International Settlements, p. 133. · 
8Einzf.g; The Euro-Dollar System, pp. 120-121.· 
9 lb id • , p • 40 • 
their total domestic borrowing. 111 0 As a case in point, at the end of 
Marcl:1 of· 1963, the 
Italian banking system had borrowed $527 million in the Euro-. 
currency market on a net basis and converted this amount into 
lire assets. Other things equal, the reserve base of the 
Italian banking system would have been $527 million smaller 
had the banks not had access to the Euro-cu+rency market. 1 1 
Thus by allowing Italian banks to borrow irl the market, the Banca 
d'Italia made expansion of domestic liquidity possible. 
In Japan Euro-dollars are.used to finance foreign and domestic 
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trade, either in the form of dollars or in yen, after being converted 
from dollars •12 In 1963, Altman estimated that as much as one-,half of 
the Euro-dollars in Japan were used to finance domestic transactions~ 13 
The focus has been on Euro-dollars used to increase credit, but 
they may also be used for the opposite reason. The same central banks 
that have encouraged use of Euro~dollars have discouraged it; and when 
rates are low iri a country, funds may flow from that domestic market· 
to the Euro-dollar m.a.rket.14 
Although Germany, Italy, and Japan are important examples of the 
use of Euro:-,dollars for domestic purposes, they are not the only ones. 
The local authorities in Britain make extensive use of Euro.-.dollars. 
10 rbid., p. 99. 
11 swoboda, p~ 2. 
12 "Sustained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking," p. 118; "Trends in · 
the Eurodollar Market," Monthly Economic Letter, First National City 
Bank of New York (.July, 1966),p. 82; Eirizig, The Euro:-,Dollar System, 
pp. 38 and 41. 
13Altman, "Euro-Dollars; Some Further Comments,'' p, 71. 
1 4Eurodollar arid International Capital Markets Tod.ay,"'Monthly 
Economic Letter. First National City Bank of New York (August, 1967), 
p. 91. 
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However, some countries, notably France, limit the use of Euro-dollars 
to financing forei.gn trade, I 5 
By making credit .available in countries with an inadequate supply 
of capital, Euro-dollars may have served to lower national interest 
rates; 16 but, by the same token, they have made it harder for central 
banks to make effective use of interest.rates in controlling credit, 17 
Even the central bankers who have used Euro-dollar·s as a tool of mone-
tary policy, · have at times found' their policymaking made more diffi-
cult by flows to and from the Euro-dollar market, 1 8 
Due to the unrestricted nature of Euro-dollars, the market has 
transmitted interest 'rate competition and "scrambles for liquidity'' 
from country to country. 19 If interest rates rise and a shortage 
of funds develops in one .. country, it will cause funds to flow into 
that country from the Euro-dollar market~ Since rates on Euro-dollars 
are determined primarily by supply and demand, any significant outflow 
of funds will cause them to rise sharply, which will atttact·funds 
from other countries to the Euro-dollar market. Thus~ "scrambles for 
liquidity'' and high interest rates are transferred from 01+e country 
to another, 2. O 
15 "Trends in the Eurodollar Market," p. 82; Altman, "Euro-Dollars: 
Some Further Co]llll1ents," p, 2. 
1 6Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p, 99, 
17Ibid,, p. 115; Altman, "Recent Developments in-Foreign Markets," 
pp, 75 and 86; '.'Euro-Dollars: Some Further Corrnnen1:s," p. 1. 
l 8Einzig, The Euro-Dollar Sys_ tern, pp. 114-115, 
19clendenning, p, 325. 
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International Monetary Pol:f,.cy 
. ' ' '" 
As m:f,.ght be expected, the Euro-dol.lar market has signiqcant 
implications for the.int~mational monetary structure ·and for central 
bankers. who ~upport ,that structure. The market has provided add:f,.-
tional international credit with which to finance increased foreign 
trade; . it ha~ been a profitable outlet for reserves and somet:J.ril.es 
a source .of reserve~; and it .has offered ·some officials a supplement· 
to their means of controlling capital flows •. But hot :money flows 
and other disequilibratin~ capital flows have also been facilitated 
by the.development of Euro'."'dollars. 
The monetary authorit:f,.es first became concerned with.Euro-dollars 
because they had acclJ.mulated large amounts of dollars due to the.con-
t:i,.nlJ.ing payments deficits of the U. S, ;:. Euro-dollars offered a lucra-
tive, a!3 well as flexible, invef;ltl!le~t mediulll for their supplies of 
dollars. As discussed.previously, in the early years of the Euro-
dollar market ,central bankers were the primary. source of dollars; they . 
a.re still net lenders althoµgh the proportion of official dollars in 
the market has declined~ 2 1 
Eur~:-dolla.r~ may be:used to increase official reserves, part{cu-
larly by.less.importS:nt central banks or by underdeveloped countries. 
Records of this type of use of Euro-.dollars are . not available, but·, 
according to Eirtzi;g, "This is.bel:f,.eved to have been act\.l.ally done.by 
some of the weaker Central Banks •.•. 112 2 Som~what similarly, Euro-
21 "Sustained Expansion in Eurodollar Banking, 11 p. 117. 
22Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p. 118; M. J. Wasserman; "Tpe 
Euro-I>o11ar Systim: . Past~ Present and Future," Commercial and Fina.n-
cial_ Chroni;cle, CCVI (July 13, 1967); p. 147. 
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dollars may reduce the. drain on official reserves, For instance, in 
Italy Euro-dollars have bee.n used extensively to finance foreign 
trade and increases in domestic liquidity whieh would have been a 
drain on official reserves had Euro-dolla:rs not been available. 23 
Payments deficits or budge.t deficits may be financed by borrow-
ing iri the Euro-dollar market, In Belgium~ there is a ce.iling on the 
advances which may be made from the National Bank to the Treasury. 
When pressing against the ceiling, the Belgian Treasury has availed 
itself of Euro,....dollar and Etiro...,currency fa.cili.ties in· order to finance 
its deficits. 2 4 Britain is another example of a country using for-. 
eign currency l1abilities (not just Euro-dollars) to finance payments 
deficits, 25 East European governments are also net borrowers. 26 Due 
to inadequate data it is difficult to distinguish bet:ween Euro-
currency financing and financing through other liabilities in foreign 
currencies; nevertheless Euro-dollars are involved. 
The Euro-dollar market has increased international liquidity. 
The efficiency with which funds are channeled from lender to borrower 
and from country to country has been improved by the market. Funds 
which previously may have remained where there was a relative surplus 
of capital are now used in countries where the demand is greater, In 
general, the extreme.ly competitive conditions in the market direct 
2 3Altman, "Euro,...Dollars: Some Further Comments," pp. 2-3. 
24Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, pp. 36 and 119; Thirty-fourth 
Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements~ pp. 67-68 and 135. 
25swoboda, pp. 2-3. 
26E' ·· Th · E D 1· ··t S ·-1 1nz1g, , .e uro- o .".ar ystem, p, I, 
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funds to where the marginal productivity of capital i.s highest~ The 
rate of turnover of funds, i ~ e o, the veloci. ty of circulation of for-
eign dollar deposits has increased, The Euro-dollar market--and in 
general the Euro-currency ma:rket---has ;increased the willingness of. 
residents of one country to hold the cu:rrency of .another, But the 
problem wit];l the market, as with many fac.ets of the. international 
monetary mechanism, is that while it works well and to the benefit· 
of many when things are normal, in ti.mes of stress the market may 
act in the opposite manner, 
The market has enabled certain central banks to influence un-
wanted inflows or outflows of capital, The·Swi.ss Bank has provided 
forward cover for its commercial banks so that they might hold dol-. 
la:ts when there have been tendencies for speculative capital to flow 
into Switzerland. 2. 7 Germany has also used ·· dollar swaps to encourage 
its banks to hold dollars when there were large,-,scale conversions 
into marks. 28 More will be said ·about this later, but the important. 
point is that central b,,H1kers have become attentive to the possi-
bilities of using Euro-dollars as a means of controlling international 
flows of ea.pi tal, 
It may be argued that the ·various monetary authorities could have 
carried out dollar swaps with their commercial banks even in the 
27"Capital Flows and International Payments," po 278; Thirty: 
fourth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements, Po 133~ 
28'.'Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations" 
(September, 1962), pp, 1141-:1143; "Treasury and Federal Reserve For-
eign Exchange Operations," Federal Reserve Bulletin, LV (March, 1969), 
p. 214. The U, S. has aided the Swiss in some of the transactions. 
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absence of the Euro-dollar market. 29 However, it would have been more 
expensive for the central banks to have their commercial banks hold 
dollars to the extent that .rates in the U, S, money market have been 
lower than those in the Euro-dollar market.30 Furthermore, U, s. 
monetary officials may not have wanted the U, S. to absorb the result-
ant capital inflow, and ·may have taken measures to check it. As it. 
is the Federal Reserve has frequently aided central banks who have 
carried out swap operations in dollars by providing all or part of 
the dollar exchange or by covering the forward· exchange risk. 
The West Germans, who have made extensive use of the Euro-dollar 
market in many areas, have partially financed construction in under-. 
developed countries through Euro..,dollars. This is facilitated by the 
ease with which renewals of Euro-dollar deposits may be made. 31 
A substantial portion of Euro-dollars i.s lent to exportera and 
importers. This has been important in view of the slow growth in the 
international gold stock; expansion of world trade must be financed, 
and Euro:-dollars have been important in meeting this need by increaa-
ing the amount of credit that can be based on a given reserve base. 
Even if the total of Euro'."'dollars employed in a 'way as to 
add to the liquid international resources is a bare frac-
tion of total annual value of forei.gn trade, owing to the 
easy availability and high ve!Ocity of Euro-dollar deposits 
the extent to which they contribute towards meeting 
29Henry N. Goldstein, Review of The Euro,...Dollar. System, Paul 
Einzig, Journal of Finance, XIX (September, 1964), pp. 570,-571. 
30ibid. 
31Einzig, The Euro,-Dollar System, p. 170. 
requirements is well in excess of the proportion suggested 
by the bare· amount. 3 2 
While Euro-dollars have.been a boon in that they have increased 
the amount of credit available to foreign traders, monetary officials 
may be dismayed because they have. thus lost part of their control 
over the financing of imports. To the extent that the.growth of the 
market has lessened the authorities' control over domestic demand, it 
has decreased their ability to oorrect payments imbalances through 
discouraging imports. 
The most potentially harmful aspect of the development of Euro:-
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dollars would exist in times of international financial crisis, Under· 
the present system of fixed exchange rates, speculation can be a par-, 
ticularly dangerous phenomenon. Whennor111al conditions and confidence 
prevail, speculators perform a useful economic function by channeling 
funds to those uses which are mo~t profitable and productive. When 
uncertainty is the order of the day, however, speculation can cause 
panic and wreak havoc on international monetary arrangements. Ulti-
mately, the blame for this capability of speculators lies with those 
officials who allow fundamentally disequilibrating payments imbalances 
to exist uncorrected for extended pe.riods of time. 3 3 But, the Euro'."" 
dollar .market does add to the facilities and resources available to 
sp~culators~ thus increasing, their power to put pressure on exchange 
rates and reser·ves . 
3 2rt must be noted that the growth of the Euro-dollar market has·. 
been accompanied by a decline in acceptances, though not.of _the same 
magnitude. Einzig, The Euro:-Dol~ar System, pp~ ·60 and 110. 
33The Euro-dollar market itself may contribute to these· officials' 
tendencies· to let such. imbalances continue since it increases the 
means availa~le for financing deficits. 
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Speculators may either· sell . a weak currency forward or borrow 
the currency and sell the spo~ exchange.' Before the advent of Euro~ 
currencies monetary authorities had considerable. control over the 
foreign borrowing of their currencies, but now holders of devaluation-
prone.Euro-currencies may lend them.to speculators~ The amount of 
fa.reign owned deposits available to speculator~ and the interest 
charged on. them. is much more favorable to speculation since the. devel,.. 
opment of Euro-currencies. 
As far· as the revaluation-prone µurrencies are concerned, Euro-
currencies may enable speculators to earn relatively high interest 
rates on speculative balances. Central bankers. previously could con-
trol interest rates paid on foreign owned deposits,3 4 
In 1961, when there was.expectation of further revaluations of 
the German mark and Dutch guilder, the market enhanced speculation in 
favor of the ma.rk, The demand for Euro-dollars increased sharply. 
They were converted 'into·marks which were then sold forward. 35 A sim-
ilar situation occurred in the last half .of 1968. 36 In 1967, the 
Euro-currency markets contributed to the pressure on the pound that 
led to· devaluation on November 18, 37 In the wake of the devaluation 
of sterling, speculators purchased large amounts of gold partially 
34For a discussion of speculation and the Euro-currency.markets 
see Einzig, A Textbook on Foreign Exchange; pp. 100-102 and '161. . 
3511Capital Flows and International Baymen:ts," pp. ·277 .... 278! 
36 "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations_,,.-
LV (march, 1969), p. 214. 
37Thirty,-eighth Annual Report_, Bank for International Settlememts, 
p. 126. 
financing their buying through the Euro-dollar market ,·3 8 These are 
some of the more notable examples which demons tr ate the potentially 
destabilizing nature of the Euro-dollar market. 
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The- last thre.e chapters have explained how the Euro-dollar market 
affects monetary . policy. The · following chapter will investigate how 
monetary policy may affect the Euro-dollar market. 
38rbid~, p. 160. 
CHAPTER VI 
OFFICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 
The previous chapter explained why the monetary authorities ar1:, 
arid should be, concerned with the Euro-dollar market. This chapter 
will consider how officials have influenced the market. 
The international character of the market'has put .it outside the 
regulation or.control of national authorities; nevertheless central 
banks have had important effects on 'the market ever since its incep-
tion. They have affected it both indirectly and directly'. 
The first part of the chaptffr will be concerned with indirect 
influence through s,uch things as general regulations regarding bank 
competitiveness, exchange controls, and interest rate policy. The· 
dis.cussion of direct intervention includes direct placements or with-
drawals, operation in forward markets, artd swaps among official 
institutions. 
Indirect Intervention 
Any central bank can make policies which can affect th.e compet-
itiveness of its banks in the.international market, For instance, 
since American banks are not required to hold reserves a~a;i.nst, or 
pay deposit insurance on liabilities to their foreign branches, they 
oan pay higher rates on deposits obtained in the Euro--:dollar market 
than on deposits acquired in the U. S. Also, American banks are not 
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subjected to the i.nterest rate regulations on time and amount when 
they borrow through the Euro-dollar market. By allowing them this 
freedom the Federal Reserve has enabled U, S. banks to be competitive 
abroad, 
Other countries have varying reserve re.qu.irements which affect 
the flow of Euro-dollars through their banks. The Bundesbank at one 
time imposed diverse reserve requireme.nts (up to .30 percent) on Euro-
dollar deposits in German connnercial banks, depending on whether they 
were used to finance domestic or foreign tra:de, 1 Japanese banks have 
had to hold 20 percent.of dollar deposits loaned domestically in 
"liquid form," and they are subject to restrictions on the interest 
they may pay. 2 (Regulations like these definitely affect the volume 
of Euro-dollar business a bank can do since Euro~banks in other coun-
tries can loan Euro-.,dollars to Japanese and German banks at lower 
rates if they are not subject to the same reserve requirements.) 
Italy, on the other hand, does not require its banks to hold reserves 
against Euro··dolla:rs, but it does limit their conversion to lire.3 
French connnercial banks may lend Euro-dollar$ to Frenchmen only to 
finance foreign trade while Swiss banks are required to place in for-
eign currencies the counterpart of any Swiss franc deposit by a non-
resident.4 These regulations can cause large differences in the 
volume of Euro-dollars flowing through a country, 
1swoboda, p. 38; Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p. 122. 
2Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System, p. 122. 
3Ibid. 
4rbid., PP· 122-123. 
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Central banks, particularly the Federal Reserve, may have sig-
nificant effects on the market through their interest rate policies. 
Witness these statements by the Federal Reserve: 
With midyear [1968] pressures out of the way and 
expectation.s · of .easier 'moneta;y condi ti.ori.s in the United 
States following passage of the .tax surcharge, Euro'."" 
dollar rates subsequently eased considerably •• : 0 5 . 
Although Euro-dollar rates rose further .in the latter part 
of December [19681, the increase reflected by and large . . 6 . 
the higher U. S. rates .••• 
In 1966 the Fed's sharply restrictive monetary policy inereased the. 
demand.for Euro-dollars by American banks which led to higher rates.7 
(See Figure. 3 in Chapter II and Figure 9 .) Early in 1967; rates ip. 
the Euro-dollar market decreased following the easing of U. $. mane-
tary policy. 8 In the first quarter of 19 69, ·.Euro-dollar rates hav.e. 
gone up to over eight percent as U.S. banks have made extensive u~e 
of Euro""'.dollars to accommodate domes tic de:QJ.atid for credit. 9 High 
interest rates on short-term funds in the.U. s. exert a pull on 
European short-term rates in genera1,10 but.the Euro-dollar market is 
5"Treasury and Federal. Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations' II 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, LIV (September, 1968), p. 742. 
611Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operat:iot),s," 
(March, 1969), p. 227, 
7 Annual Report, Boatd . of · Governors of the .• Federal Reserve 
System (196'6), p. · 270. 
8Annual Report~ Board of Governors of'the Federal Reserve 
System (1966), p~ 270 •. ' 
911Treasury. and Federal Reserve Fore.ign ,Exchange Operations•·• 
(March, 1969), ·p~ 227. 
I0 11Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations," 
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Note: Rates are weekly and in percentages per annum 
Source: Thirty-Eighth Annual Report, Bank .for International 
Settlements (Basle, 10 June 1968), p. 158. 
Figure 9. Three-month Rates of Interest in 
London and New York 
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particularly affected due to the large number of U.S. banks which 
have branches operating in the market on their behalf. 
Interest rates in-other countries influence Euro,-,dollars also. 
Low rates.in national money markets can cause an outflow of funds to 
Euro-dollars, e. g., in 1968 funds moved from Germany where "inter-
bank loan rates were 3 1/2 to 3 3/4 percent" to the Eu'ro:-,dollar mar-. 
ket. 11 High national rates can bring about a reduction in the supply 
of Euro-:dollars through.a flow of funds to local markets. When the 
pound was under pressure, officials had to intervene in order to keep 
high rates in England from drawing Euro-dollar rates upward, 12 
Exchange controls, "voluntary" guidelines, and other pressures 
may be used by the monetary authori_ties to affect their· connnercial 
banks' activity inEuro-dollars. Thevariety of such measures is 
infinite, ranging from such extreme measures as bl6'cking of foreign 
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deposits to requesting banks not to engage in Euro-dollar transactions. 
One· example of pressures that can be brought to bear by officials 
has occurred in Canada. In April of 1968, The Banker reported that· 
the central bank of ·Canada has requested connnercial banks 
and other financial organizations not to facilitate 
swapped deposit•transactions--described as the main link 
between the Canadian short-term interest rate structure 
and rates prevailing in the Euro-dollar market. 13 
The officials hoped·· that by isolating Canadian banks from the market 
12Annual Report; Board of Go:vernors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1967), ,PP· 288-289. 
13"International Review,'' The Banker, CXVIII (April, 1968), p~ 
365. 
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they could keep Euro...,dollar rates from drawing up those in Canada. 14 
U. S. authorities can have significant eff.eets on the market 
through their interest rate policy, by decreasing the alternative. 
credits granted by co1Il11lercial banks in the.u. s., or by increasing 
American demand for Euro-dollars. It has·. already been pointed out 
how domestic policy encourages or discourages Americans from using 
the Euro-dollar market as a source of.credit.and liquidity. Similar 
effects can be produced by means of exchange controls and voluntary 
guidelines. 
In 1965 President Johnson's appeal to Americans to abstain 
from transferring their funds abroad produced a spectacular 
effect on the market. There was an immediate contraction 
in the supply of Euro:""dollars and their rates rose sharply. l 5 
Exchange controls to curb bank lending abroad, such as those initiated 
in January, · 19 68, 16 may also affect the Euro'.""dollar market by altering . 
the substitutes for Etiro-,dollar deposits and thus the demand for 
Euro-dollars. 
The Bank of France has taken a step regarding the market which 
is especially serious. for those who are concerned about· possible 
chain reactions that might result from defa~lts. After indiscriminate 
lending le4 to heavy losses by. one of France's leading banks, the 
French officials declared that French conn:nerci.al banks would not auto-
matically be granted permission to replace dollars lost through 
14Ibid. 
15Einzig, The· Euro-Do.llar Sys tern, p, 86 • 
16Thirty-eighth Annual Report~ Bank for International Settle-
ments, pp. 27.:..za. 
default. 17 Thus, if French banks were faced with large-scal.e~r 
Euro~dollar loans, they might not be able to honor their commitments 
in dollars .• 
Direct Interv~ntion 
It was· not uritil recently that the monetary authorities began 
to intervene.in the Euro-dollar market as.a means of influencing the 
market itself; however, from the very beginning of the Euro-dollar 
market they hav~ had an impor.tant part in it~ 
Originally central banks were· the main source of funds, for the· 
Euro-dollar market. They encouraged its growth because the market 
opened up a valuable outlet .for their large and increasing dollar· 
holdings; however, they seemed to be blissfully unaware of the diffi-
culties it would pose in their policymaking. Up to 1963 central 
banks, treasuries, and other offieial institutions were the largest 
owners of Euro-dollars. l 8 . Gradually, howev.er, the monetary officials 
began to realize that· the growth of the market ·could weaken their · 
control over money markets and .some began to withdraw their funds 
from the Euro-dollar market .19 This is not to say that governments 
have withdrawn completely from Euro-dollars; central banks still are 
17~inzig, The Euro-Dollar System, pp. 74 and 149. 
18Makowski, p. 95. 
19Einz~g, The Euro~Dollar System, p,. 86; and A Textbook of·For-
eign Exchange, p·. 19.4. In fa~t, ·" ..• semi-official agreei:nents have · 
been made within the framework of the International Monetary Fund 
to limit the amount of dollar1:1 ·placed by European central banks in·.· 
the Eu.ro-dollar market • ." Makowski, p. 190. 
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"substantial suppliers, 112 0 and governments use Eur.o-:-dollars, for ex'.'"· 
ample~ British local authorities and the Belgian federal government! 21 
More recently, monetary officials have placed.funds iti the.Euro-
dollar marlcet in order to stabilize it, 
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The Bank for Interna.tional Settlements has· intervened in. the mar-
ket on an increasing scale to alleviate pressures. The first time 
that BIS intervention became apparent was. in th:e .. latter part of 1966, 
when sterling was. weak.. Fearing that usual year:end withdrawals of· 
funds wo~ld incre~se the Euro-dollar rate and exert a pull on other 
currencies, especially ;the pound, the BIS'deppsited $275 million in 
t~e m,;lrket,. 22 In June of 1967 when the Middle East crisis brought a 
sharp.rise in rates, the BIS again 1;1upplied funds to.the market·in 
order to mit:igate.the rise in !riterest rates. 23 In the last quarter 
of that year, w~en .the pound came.under increasing pressure which 
finally led to devaluation, the BI~ added to the supply of Euro-dollars 
in order to keep interest rates in the market from draw::t.rig funds out 
of .sterling.24 
2011Sustained E~ansio:p. .in Eurodollar Banking," p. 117. 
21Makowski, p. 95. 
22Annual- Report, Board. of Governo.rs of the Federal Reserve 
System {1966), p. 272. 
23Annual Report, Board of Gove~ors of the Federal Reserve 
Syst:em (1967), p. 279, 
24Ibi4,, pp, 281 and 295, Total placements by the BIS in 
November 1967 wei:e $106 million; in December· they were $240 µdllion. 
Thirty...,e::i.ghth Annuai Report,, Bank for International Settlements. 
The BIS does no~ publish tts annµal .report for 1968 until mid-, 
1969; t:hus, data. for that year is not avai+able ~ · Paul Eindg, how-
ever, · stated . on Apr::f,.1 25, 1968 
until a few months ago their volume [Euro-dollar deposits 
lent by the .:ins] was relatively small. It is only during 
recent months that they assumed considEfrable ·importance. 
Today officia:l·operation~ in Euro..;.dollars by the BIS are 
looke~ upon in the:same way as 9perati6ns in dollars were 
looked upon before· devaluation-:-..:.as a major fa.ctor whi.ch · 
is l:t,a:ble ·to influenc~ the.trend qf the market consider-,. 
ably ~ 2 5 · · · · 
Thes.e placements by t:he .BIS are estimated to have kept interest ·rates 
in the ~uro~dollar market 1/2 to 1/4 p~rcentag~ points below what 
they wouJ,d · have been · otherwise on April 25 • 2.6 
. .. . •, ~ 
He al.so points out that the BIS does. not place . dc;,llars in short-
term deposits but •on+Y in longer term ones; becaµse s~orter-term 
Euro-dollars are frequently used for speculative purposes. 27 
The Swiss National .Bank.has placed funds in.the Euro-dollar· 
marke; on occasion •. +he·dollars were usually obtained through swaps 
with Swiss c.om.mercial banks. Iri the .lat.ter part of 1966 ap.d in Mar.ch 
of·l967, the,SWi!3S National Bank channeled funds into the Euro-dollar 
~arket after swapping Swiss francs for dollars with its connnercial 
banks 28 .... 
The monetary.authorities can·have important effectei on the Euro":"; 
dollar market through their,operations.;in foreign exchange markets. 
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2?Paul Einzig, l'The Euro-Dollar Mark.et Stabilized by the B, I.S .• ," , 
Commercial ·and Financial Chronicle~ CCVI~ (April 25, 1968), p. 1670 .. 
;, , .. •, . . . . . . ... · .. ' . 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28Annual Report, ;Bo~n::d of Governors of the Federal. Reserve 
System (1966),' pt '27.2, (1967) ~ p', 300. 
As explained above the.Swiss National Ba11k swapped fotward Swiss 
francs for spot dollars and placed the proceeds in the Euro~dollar 
market. Other .central banker.s have used swaps · alone to affect the 
flow of funds ,to and from the market;29 still others have operated· 
directly in foreign exchange lDl;lrket~ for the.same ends. 
As early.as 1961 the German Bundesbank initiated policies in 
exchange markets which h~d· an effect on the.Euro-dollar market. 
Following the.revaluation of the Deutsche mark and Dutch guilder in 
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the first of March, speculation on further changes in exchange rates.-~ 
e~pecially a further revaluation in the mark~-led to massive flows of 
funds into marks. The premium on the forward mark jumped to four 
percent· 
The limited availability of forward cover, even at such 
expensive rates, diverted commercial hedging demands into 
foreign purchases of spot marks to. cover future mark con-
tracts and German borrowing of dollars both in New· York· 
and in the Euro-dollar market as a hedge agains dollar 
receivables. 30 
Communications betiieen the Bundesbank and the Fed led to sales of . 
forw~rd marks by the Fed for the Treasury in order to decrease the 
premium on the. forward mark, i. e", to decrease the discount on the. 
forward dollar. The German Bundesbank provided cover for the 
Treasury. 31 This foreign exchange operation 
29 Swaps i:ti this context are purchases of spot excha11ge. against 
sale of forward exchange, or sale· of spot exchange against purchase .. 
of forward exchange •. 
30 11Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations," 
(September, 1962) ~ ·PP. 1140'."'1141. 
31 Ibid.; "International Payments Imbalances and ·Need for 
Strengthening International Financial Arrangements," Rea.rings Before 
the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (May 16, June 19, 
20, and 21, 1961), pp.· 100-101. · 
had the·· further :important result of providing an alternative 
to German borrowing :in New York~ or the Euro-dollar market,.· 
in ·.order· to hedge agairl.st future dollar receipts, 32 · 
Similar transaot:f,ons were carried out in gu+lders and Swiss 
francs which wel'.e also under, th_e infltlence of expectat:Lcms of appre""." 
o,iation. 33 
In addition, the Bundesbank encouraged ~t~ -commercial banks to 
hold fore:ig~ assets by.selling forward marks against purchases·of 
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spot marks at forward rates lower than those prevailing in the market. 
This .reduced the cost of hedging to the commercial banks by decreas-
:f,ng the· cost of forward cover~ · To some extent the banks used· the 
spot exchange obtained frpm the Bundesbank to purchase Euro:dollars. 34 
In recent years the ~onetary authorities .have begun to :iritervene: 
in the forward market .in order to influence trends in.the Euro-dollar 
market. Intervention first "became apparentn ,in early 1965 when the 
voluntary U. s. guidelines put a severe l:itrain ori the market. 35 The· 
Italian Ex9,hange Office, supported by the U~ Sp Federal. Reserve and 
Treasury, swapped substantial sums· of .dollars ($1,170 million) aga~nst 
lire without cost, to· the ~tal:i,.an commerc:f,al banks. 36 The· banks use<! 
the funds to make. loans in the Euro-dollar market and· tp reduce the.ir 
33 "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations," 
pp. 1142-1150. 
3411Capita1 Flows and International Payments," p~ 27,7. 
3 s.clenden-niflg_, p. 32~ •. 
36Thirty-sb:th Annual Report, Ba1;1.k. for . Iµterpational Settlements, 
p. 24. . . . . · , . 
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indebtedness there. 37 U. S. officials covered the exchange risk 
undertaken by the Italian Exchange Office. 
This flow of funds from Italy was in direct contrast with the 
reduction in supply coming from the U. S. Interest rates in the Euro-
dollar market increased during 1965, but undoubtedly not as much as 
they would have in the absence of official intervention. 38 (See 
Figure 9.) 
The more notable instances of central banks that have affected 
Euro--dollars through· foreign exchange operations are those in Germany, 
Italy, Switzerland, and France. 39 By irifluencing forwara rates they 
have been able to aff.ect the flow of Euro-dollars to and from their. 
countries. The Bundesbank, the Swiss National ~ank, and the Italian 
Exchange Office have pri111B-rily used swaps with their commercial banks 
to influence forward rates. 40 · The Bank of France·operates di.rectly 
in the foreign exchange market. 4 l. 
Foreign exchange operations by the Federal Reserve have been 
facilitated by reciprocal currency agreements, i. .e., swaps 
37They reduced dollar liabilities to countries other than the 
U. S. by $310 million, increased dollar assets vis a vis non-residents 
by $600, and increased lending to residents--:mainly in marks and 
Swiss france..,..,by $260 million. Ibid., pp. 24, 138, 141, and 144. 
38The total of dollars supplied by the Italian Exchange Office 
was $1.5 billion at the end of 1965. At that time the new size of 
the market was $9.5 billion. Ibid,, pp. 138, 149:'"150. 
39Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System 9 pp. 1,21-122. 
40Ibid., p. 120. 
41 Ibid., p. 121. 
under which a central bank agrees to exchange on request 
its own currency for the currency of the other party up 
to a maximum amount over a limited period of time ..•. 4~ 
Whereas·other central bat1ks participate directly in the foreign ex-
change market, the Fed, for the most part, transacts exchange opera-
tions directly with other officials. 43 These swap facilities of the 
Federal Reserve have had an important influence on the Euro-dollar 
market because many of the.actions by other offtcial institutions to 
affect the market have beert carried out with dollars acquired from 
the Fed. 44, Also, the Federal Reserve has'frequently covered the for-
ward exchange risk incurred by other central banks when they have 
swapped .their currency forward for spot dollars. 
The .BIS which, as previously mentioned, has carried out exten,-
sive stab:Uizing measures tn the Euro-dollar market, has done so to 
a .large extent with dollars obtained from the Federal Reserve, 45 
The Fed's reciprocal currency agreement with the BIS amounted t6 
$1,600,000 as of March 10, 1968. 46 This represents the amount of 
dollars the BIS may obtain from the Fed upon request. 
The Federal Reserve, along w~th the Treasury, has provided cover. 
4211Treasµry and Federal Rese:rve Foreign Exchange Operations," 
(September, 1962), p. 1147. 
43Ibid., p. 1149. 
44The swap facilities amount to $10,505 million as of March 10, 
1969. "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations," 
(March, 1969)~ p. 212. 
45Annual Report, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1966), p. 272; (1967), pp. 279, 281, 295. 
46 "Treasuryand Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operationsli 
(March, 1969), p. 212. 
76 
77 
for some bf the swaps carried out by Italian and German central bankers 
with their connnercial banks. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Euro-dollar market is a large internati.onal market for dollar 
deposits outside the United States. The market is very competitive; 
so that the Euro-dollar rates are determ:i.ned by the market forces of 
supply and demand. Participators in the market come from many coun-
tries throughout.the world. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the mpnetary officials 
should be concerned with the Eu.ro-dollar market because it has impor-
tant effects on the variables that l!lOnetary policy focuses on; Fur-
thermore, the impact of Euro:-dollar.s is not limited to the interna-
tional sphere but extends to domestic monetary policy as .well. The 
paper also demonstrates that the monetary authorities can have signif~ 
icant effects on the market.~ 
By increasing capital mobility among.countries, the Euro-dollar 
/,ii 
market has made monetary policies more tnterdependent. At the same 
time the market has provided central bankers with an additional means 
-of'checking capital flows or affect:Lng domestic credit, Particularly 
important for central bankers wishing to maintain fixed exchange rates· 
have been the increased facilities for speculation offered by the 
Euro-dollar market. 
The contrpl of the U~ S'. monetary authorities pve:t the domestic 
credit structure has .. been weakened by the access of U. S. commercial 
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banks.to.the Euro-dollar market.· They ~ay circumvent reserve require-
ments and Regulation Q by.acquiring Euro-dollars. They are also in a 
position to obtain.liqµiq.funds from tl).e Euro-dollar market when the 
Federal Reserve is attempting to restrict credit. expansion •. 
In the internat:1,.onal sphere, the Euro-dollar market may have fa,-. . . 
vorable or harmful effects on.the U. S. balance of payments as defined 
on a liquidity basis~ The market per ~ is neutral, and the question 
of its effects is. an empirical one •.. The market has probably decreased 
the U. s. deficit measured according to the official settlements def.,-
initionby decreasing the proportion of dollars held by foreign central 
banks in tq.e U. S. The, doll;;l.r exchange rate may be subjected to addi""' 
tional spe~ulative pressure in times of crisis due·to the credit facil~ 
ities provided by the Euro,-dollar _market~-
In some countries outside the u. s., the monetary pfficials hav.e 
used Euro-dollars as a suppleµientary tool in expanding or contra.cting 
domes tic liq.uidi ty. Germany~ Italy, and J apc3n have made the. most 
extensive use. of Eu_ro-dollars for domest:i,.c .purposes. 
The Euro-dollar market transmits inter.est rate competition and 
scraljlbles for credit from country to country. Thus the growth of.the 
market has made the monetary poli1:!ies of c.ountries more interdepende:q.t. 
Central bankers outside the United States have used the.Euro-
dollar market as a profitable outlet for their large holdings of dol~ 
lars whi:J,,e for some central banks the,market has prov:f.ded a'source of 
reserves. The· growth of Euro-dollars has. added to the international 
credit available to fina:q.ce .. foreign trade, but. it ·_has also augmE!rited 
( 
the financing available to speculators. Euro-dollars have been. used 
by the monetary officiais in some countries :as an aid in check,ing. 
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capital flows. 
Central bankers can have ... .,.and have had--effects on the market. 
The monetary authorities have important influences on their commercial 
banks' activ:i.tie~ in the market through regulations affecting bank com,. 
petit:f,.veness., for exaniple, reserve requirements. Exchange controls 
and interest rate policies have indirect effects on the market. The 
Federal Reserve :in particular strongly affects the market through its 
:interest :rate policy, 
In rec'=nt years the,officia.l monetary institutions.have become 
increasingly aware of the.market's effects pn their monetary policies 
and have :intervened to influence Eurp-dollar rates by supplying funds 
both directly and indirectly i On various occasic:ms the Bank for Inter:-
national Settlements has stabilized the ma.rket by supplying dollars 
obtained frpm the Federal Reserve .. 
The possibilities for establishing a single definition of a 
Euro"""dollar and for imprpving the stat:i.s'tics available on Euro-dollars 
should be investigated. The BIS has made significant progress iri this 
area, but much remains to be done. Only eleven countries report to 
the BIS. Furthermore, it does not publish very comprehensive data; 
for instance, it would be val11able to have tables of Euro-dolh.r rates · 
fpr various maturities. However, th'= BIS usually only p11blishes a 
graph of three-month Euro-dollar rates, It would be interesting to 
see, hpw Eu,ro.-dollar rates va.'ry among countries, but thi.s :i.rifornuift:l.on 
is· unavailable,. Attention should also be focused on coming. up with a 
more satisfactory definition of a Euro-dollar or refining one of the 
existing ones, in order that dat~ supplied by different institutipns 
would be comparable 1 
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